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ABSTRACT
Migrants into European countries are often less educated than European natives. We analyse
whether migrants’ children are more or less likely than natives’ children to achieve upward
educational mobility across generations, and study differences in the factors, which contribute
to differences in mobility for the two groups. We find that migrants’ descendants are more often
upwardly mobile (and less often downwardly mobile) than their native peers in the majority of
countries studied, and show that the main factor contributing to these patterns is the education
level of parents. Although a lower parental education means that their children are less likely to
access the same amount of human, social and financial capital as children of more highly
educated parents, migrants’ descendants over the last two generations were able to make
significant progress in reducing education gaps with natives.
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I. Introduction
The tremendous influx of immigrants into Europe
over the past several decades, particularly of people
from poorer and politically less stable countries, has
been the source of large social and demographic shifts.
A particular challenge of these shifts is that migrants
into western European countries are typically less edu-
cated than people in the native population. If immi-
grants’ children are unable to surpass their parents’
education levels and get closer to reducing the gap
between their own and natives’ education levels,
migrant communities will remain at a disadvantage
and more likely be a burden for their destination
countries’ public welfare systems (see Barrett and
McCarthy 2007; Blume and Verner 2007; Boeri 2010;
Pellizzari 2013; Huber and Oberdabernig 2016). In this
article, we examine the probability that descendants of
native-born versus foreign-born parents reach higher
education levels than their parents in 11 European
countries. Further, we identify the drivers of the differ-
ences in intergenerational mobility for the two groups.
The literature on migrants’ (and their descen-
dants’) educational attainment shows that migrant
academic success is often significantly lower than
that of native-born persons (as shown in Schütz,
Ursprung, and Wößmann 2008; Schneeweis 2011;
Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara 2012; Aydemir,
Chen, and Corak 2013; Schneebaum, Rumplmaier,
and Altzinger 2016; for example). In this article, we
investigate whether this gap in achievement narrows
across generations by studying differences in inter-
generational mobility for the two groups. We are
interested in knowing if second-generation migrants
or natives in the last generation were more likely to
reach higher education than their parents, and in
particular, in explaining which factors drive these
patterns. If the children of lower educated migrants
were more likely to surpass their parents’ education
level or make greater strides than their native peers,
migrants’ children are less likely to remain disadvan-
taged across generations as they narrow the gap in
educational attainment with natives.
A challenge for catching up in terms of education
is that school performance is strongly related to
one’s social and economic background.1 Migrants’
worse educational outcomes in many countries are
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.
CONTACT Alyssa Schneebaum alyssa.schneebaum@wu.ac.at Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1,
1020 Vienna, Austria
1A large literature finds educational attainment to be strongly related to the socioeconomic background of an individual’s parents (see Becker and Tomes
1979, 1986; for theoretical foundations, Haveman and Wolfe 1995; for a review of the foundational empirical literature, and Dustmann, Rajah, and Soest
2003; Bauer and Riphahn 2007; Chevalier et al. 2013; for some recent studies on European countries).
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due at least in part to the socioeconomic conditions
related to their families having come from another
country, in particular lower levels of financial, social
and human capital (e.g. Riphahn 2003; Colding
2006; Schneeweis 2011; Lüdemann and Schwerdt
2013) and what Lüdemann and Schwerdt (2013)
call ‘general inequalities’ which affect migrant stu-
dents’ educational success. Educational upward
mobility for migrants would thus come in spite of
the circumstances around their migration back-
ground. Relatedly, though, much of the literature
on the economics of immigration suggests that
migrants might be more skilled than people who
choose to stay in their country of birth, because
more able and motivated people are the ones who
self-select into migration (see Chiswick 1978, 1999;
Borjas 1987, 1994).
The empirical literature on educational attain-
ment shows that for the population as a whole,
institutions such as preschool enrolment (the earlier,
the better) (Schütz, Ursprung, and Wößmann 2008;
Bauer and Riphahn 2009b), age of entry into school
(again, the earlier the better) (Deming and Dynarski
2008; Bauer and Riphahn 2009a) and age of first
tracking (later is better) (Dustmann 2004; Bauer
and Riphahn 2006a; Hanushek and Wößmann
2006; Schütz, Ursprung, and Wößmann 2008;
Wößmann 2009) all contribute to greater interge-
nerational mobility. 2 Analyses which look instead
more specifically at differences in educational mobi-
lity between immigrants and natives usually find that
the educational outcome of migrants’ children is
determined by their parents’ educational achieve-
ment to a lesser extent than it is for natives’ descen-
dants, which is typically interpreted as greater
educational mobility for migrants. Summary statis-
tics in Gang and Zimmermann (2000), Dustmann
(2008) and Yaman (2014) show that children of the
on-average less educated migrants in Germany are
more mobile than their native peers. Similarly, Bauer
and Riphahn (2006b) find that in Switzerland, a
greater percentage of children from low-educated
migrants compared to low-educated natives are
upwardly mobile, while Schneebaum, Rumplmaier,
and Altzinger (2016) show that in Austria, these
results are gender specific: second-generation sons
are more likely than natives’ sons to be upwardly
mobile, but that daughters of migrants are less likely
than daughters of natives to be mobile. Finally, the
results in Van Ours and Veenman (2003) suggest
that controlling for the lower education of the immi-
grant parents renders the second-generation educa-
tion gap statistically insignificant in the Netherlands.
None of these papers go into a discussion of the
drivers of the mobility differences, which is one of
the contributions of this article.
Thus, while the existing body of literature has
been very valuable for painting a picture of how
intergenerational mobility differs by migration back-
ground and which institutions help mobility for the
broader population, it has been quiet on the drivers
of mobility differences between the migrant and
native populations. An exception is a study by
Bauer and Riphahn (2013), which looks at the insti-
tutional characteristics that differently affect the
probability of mobility for migrants and natives in
Switzerland. Bauer and Riphahn (2013) study the
joint effects of institutional differences across Swiss
cantons and find that it is early kindergarten entry
which most positively affects the chances of inter-
generational mobility for second-generation
migrants, while later tracking and especially kinder-
garten attendance and early school entry positively
affects the chances of upward mobility for natives.
While the analysis in Bauer and Riphahn (2013) is at
the level of institutional differences, it would also be
useful to have an understanding of mobility drivers
at the individual level, which we provide here.
The contribution of this article to the literature is
thus threefold. First, in contrast to the majority of
previous studies, we explicitly distinguish between
educational upward and downward mobility, rather
than interpreting the strength of intergenerational
correlations or elasticities as the key indicator of
mobility. Weak elasticities and correlations imply
more intergenerational mobility, but cannot speak
to the direction of the mobility. In order to be able
to say whether intergenerational mobility for
migrants is such that it is also closing the gap in
educational attainment with natives, migrants’
2Also relevant in this literature are the findings from Fredriksson and Öckert (2005) and Puhani and Weber (2007), who show that school entry at an older
age is correlated with greater academic achievement – although these findings may be related to the fact that older children are better performers
because they are older and thus have had more time to accumulate skills. Elder and Lubotsky (2009) also measure student achievement and point to the
importance of family background in academic success.
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mobility must be more likely to be upward. We thus
analyse the differing probabilities of upward and
downward mobility for the two populations, sepa-
rately. In addition, we analyse the magnitude of
upward mobility by comparing individuals whose
educational attainment is two classes higher than
those of their parents.
Second, we address the fact that in much of the
empirical literature, the intergenerational correla-
tions or elasticities of the migrant and native popu-
lations are compared without accounting for the fact
that migrants are a priori more likely to be upwardly
mobile, because their parents often have less educa-
tion than natives’ parents. The lower educational
attainment of the migrants’ parents gives second-
generation migrants a lower threshold to pass in
order to be upwardly mobile. Ignoring this fact
could easily lead to a misinterpretation of the greater
mobility observed for migrants in the literature. In
our analysis, we account for the fact that migrant
parents are often less educated than natives, and test
for mobility differences that may exist once eliminat-
ing the difference in the thresholds to pass across
populations. To do so, we compare the mobility
patterns of children of natives and migrants with
the same education level.
Finally, to our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate which personal, parental and household-
level characteristics are correlated with the mobility
differences between natives’ and migrants’ children.
In doing so, we provide some explanations of the
mobility patterns that have been detected in many
previous studies, but which have been left broadly
unexplained. Knowing the characteristics which are
related to the mobility differences between the two
populations is important, because this information
could be used to inform policy targeting educational
advancement for one or the other groups
specifically.
The results of our analysis confirm that in many
European countries, migrants are more likely to be
upwardly mobile (and less likely to be downwardly
mobile) than natives.3 We find that differences in the
socioeconomic background between natives and
immigrants explain a large part of the difference in
mobility patterns. In particular, the weaker educa-
tional attainment of migrants’ parents – and the
lower threshold for upward mobility it implies – is
a central factor in why second-generation migrants
appear to be more upwardly mobile in many coun-
tries. Once the differences in parental education are
taken into account, second-generation migrants
remain significantly more likely to be upwardly
mobile only in Switzerland and in Luxembourg
(while in the Czech Republic the opposite applies).
In these three countries, the mobility gap is mainly
driven by the size of the household when the respon-
dents were 14 years old, as well as the age structure
of second-generation migrants. Focusing on the
extent of upward mobility, we find that second-gen-
eration migrants are more likely than natives’ chil-
dren to surpass the education level of their parents
by two education classes only in the United
Kingdom, while in all other countries the differences
are statistically insignificant.
This article is structured as follows. Section II
summarizes the data sources and provides descrip-
tive statistics on education levels of educational
mobility. Section III introduces the methodologies
used in this article and summarizes the results of the
multivariate analyses. Section IV concludes the
article.
II. Data
We use data from the 2011 European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC), which include information on each respon-
dents’ parents, household circumstances when the
respondents were 14, and standard demographic
and socioeconomic information for respondents
aged 25–59 in 2011.4 Upward (downward) mobility
is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent
achieves a higher (lower) education level than their
3An exception are the Baltic countries, where migrant parents are more highly educated on average than native parents.
4We base our analysis on EU-SILC data rather than on data from alternative sources (e.g. the European Social Survey, ESS; the Generations and Gender
Survey, GGS; the Survey of Adult Skills, PIAAC; and the European Values Survey, EVS), because of the availability of more detailed information on
educational attainment (in comparison to PIAAC), the availability of information on a person’s socioeconomic background (especially parental character-
istics and information on household composition when the respondent was 14 years old), which is not available to the same extent in some other
databases (in ESS, PIAAC), the larger coverage of European countries (in comparison to GGS), or the larger sample size (in comparison to EVS). Still, our
sample size for second-generation migrations is quite small in some countries. Thus, we rely on Bayesian estimation methods throughout the article (see
section ‘Logit estimations’).
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most highly educated parent, where education is
measured in four categories (illiterate; ISCED 0–2;
ISCED 3–4; ISCED 5–6).5 We study the sub-popula-
tion of respondents who have completed their edu-
cation and who were born in the country of
residence and form two groups: natives (those with
at least one parent born in the same country as the
respondent) and migrants’ descendants, or second-
generation migrants (those whose parents were born
in another country).6
A summary of the educational attainment of
respondents and their parents is provided in
Table 1.7 Native-born parents are more likely to
have tertiary education than the migrants in all coun-
tries but Austria, Switzerland, Estonia and the United
Kingdom, and are less likely to be illiterate in all
countries but Latvia and Germany.8 Comparing the
educational attainment of migrants and natives over
generations, we can observe a decrease in the achieve-
ment gap between the two groups. In the parental
generation, migrants were more likely than natives to
be illiterate in all but two countries, but the children
of migrants and natives are about equally (un)likely to
be illiterate. Further, in Switzerland, Croatia and the
United Kingdom, migrants’ children are even more
likely to have a tertiary education than natives’ chil-
Table 1. Education level by migration background.
Parent Descendant
Illiterate
(%)
ISCED 0–2
(%)
ISCED 3–4
(%)
ISCED 5–6
(%)
Average education
(%)
Illiterate
(%)
ISCED 0–2
(%)
ISCED 3–4
(%)
ISCED 5–6
(%)
Average
education
Natives and their descendants
AT 0.0 33 52 16 1.83 0.0 11 66 24 2.13
BE 0.1 45 28 27 1.82 0.0 17 38 46 2.29
CH 0.1 15 69 15 2.00 0.0 5 65 30 2.25
CZ 0.0 56 33 11 1.54 0.0 6 76 17 2.11
DE 0.0 7 60 33 2.26 0.0 4 53 43 2.39
EE 0.0 27 49 24 1.98 0.0 11 56 33 2.22
FR 0.4 72 12 15 1.43 0.0 16 47 37 2.21
HR 0.1 53 39 8 1.55 0.0 20 64 16 1.97
LU 0.1 39 51 10 1.71 0.2 26 48 25 1.98
LV 0.2 35 46 19 1.83 0.3 13 55 31 2.17
UK 0.5 52 26 22 1.69 0.0 9 49 42 2.33
Migrants and their descendants
AT 0.0 44 38 18 1.74 0.0 23 57 21 1.98
BE 9.5 69 17 5 1.17 0.0 22 50 27 2.05
CH 5.4 38 41 16 1.67 0.0 6 64 31 2.25
CZ 3.8 77 17 2 1.17 0.0 20 70 10 1.90
DE 0.0 27 50 23 1.96 0.0 3 56 41 2.39
EE 0.0 22 45 33 2.11 0.0 9 58 33 2.24
FR 9.3 76 8 7 1.12 0.0 17 50 33 2.16
HR 0.4 58 34 7 1.48 0.0 21 61 17 1.96
LU 0.6 67 25 8 1.40 0.3 23 55 22 1.98
LV 0.0 34 48 18 1.84 0.2 13 63 24 2.11
UK 2.7 58 18 22 1.58 0.0 3 41 56 2.53
Authors’ calculations are based on 2011 EU-SILC data. Parent and descendant stand for the education level of the highest educated parent or the
respondent, respectively. In the empirical analysis on upward mobility, persons whose more highly educated parent reached the highest education level
are dropped. In the analysis on downward mobility, persons whose parents are illiterate are dropped. Country-codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium,
CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, EE = Estonia, FR = France, HR = Croatia, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, UK = United Kingdom.
5ISCED 0–2 corresponds to pre-primary through lower-secondary education, ISCED 3–4 to upper secondary through post-secondary non-tertiary education
and ISCED 5–6 to tertiary education.
6We compare persons with at least one parent born in their country of residence to persons for whom this is not the case, assuming that the native born
parent is able to help their child at school in a similar way as parents who are both native born. We exclude persons who did not yet finish their education
and persons with missing information on their parents or missing values for any explanatory variable from the sample. For the analysis of upward mobility,
we exclude respondents whose more highly educated parent has reached the highest education class because these persons can per definition not be
upwardly mobile. Similarly, we exclude persons whose parents have the lowest education class in the analysis of downward mobility. Information on which
share of observations is dropped in each step is available in Table A4 in Appendix A. The exclusion of observations due to missing information on parental
characteristics or explanatory variables could lead to selection bias, which would arise if observations are non-randomly missing across the two groups.
While we have no means to check the direction of potential bias for missing information on parental characteristics (such as education or country of birth),
Table A5 in Appendix A provides an overview of the mobility differences between natives and migrants for observations that have been excluded because
of missing information on explanatory variables. Table A5 (and Table E.2 in the online appendix) show the impact of different possibilities of observations
being dropped due to missing observations.
7Descriptive statistics for the control variables that are used in the multivariate analysis for the full sample can be found in Table A1 in Appendix A. Table A3
provides an overview of the definitions of the variables.
8Treating education levels as a cardinal scale, native parents are more educated than migrant parents on average in all countries but Estonia and Latvia, as
indicated by the column labelled ‘average education’. The Baltic countries are likely to be different from the other countries included in our analysis
because they regained independence from the Soviet Union only in the early 1990s. Thus, immigration into these countries was to a big part internal.
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dren, and in more than half of the countries (6 of 11)
migrants’ children are more likely to have completed
upper secondary education (ISCED 3–4). Thus, we
begin to see evidence of greater educational mobility
for descendants of migrants in many of the countries
in our sample.
Taking a closer look at upward mobility, Table 2
shows the proportion of natives’ and migrants’ des-
cendants, which is upwardly mobile for each country
in our sample, given the highest education level of
their parents. In all countries but Estonia and Latvia,
a greater share of migrants’ children than natives’
children are in a higher education class than their
parents, in total. Descendants of migrants with lower
secondary education or less (ISCED 0–2) show higher
mobility than native descendants with lower-second-
ary educated parents in all countries but Austria, the
Czech Republic and Estonia. In most countries, chil-
dren of low-educated migrants seem to be upwardly
mobile more often than children of low-educated
natives. In the former two countries where this is not
the case (Austria and the Czech Republic), however,
children of more highly educated parents with a
migration background (with upper- or post-secondary
education, ISCED 3–4) are more often upwardly
mobile than those of natives. Indeed, children of
migrants with upper- or post-secondary education
are at least as mobile as descendants of similarly
educated natives in half of the countries in our sample
(Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, France,
Croatia and the United Kingdom).
In what follows we examine how robust these dif-
ferences are, once we compare descendants of
migrants and natives from otherwise similar house-
holds, and study which characteristics drive the differ-
ences in mobility across migration background. To
explore these issues, we turn to a multivariate analysis
predicting mobility in section ‘Logit estimation’, and
then decompose the detected mobility differences in
section ‘Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition’.
III. Empirical analysis
Logit estimations
Taking the insights gained in the descriptive
exploration of the data above, namely that children
of the often lower educated group of migrants
appear to be more mobile than their native counter-
parts in many countries, we move to a more struc-
tural analysis of these patterns and their causes. In a
first step, using logit models, we investigate whether
second-generation migrants are significantly more
often mobile than natives once accounting for
respondents’ socioeconomic backgrounds.
We use Bayesian estimation techniques through-
out the article.9 Bayesian methods rely on Bayes’
rule, which is applied to learn about the parameters,
β, given the data, y
pðβjyÞ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
posterior
/ pðyjβÞ|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
likelihood
pðβÞ|{z}
prior
; (1)
Table 2. Upward mobility by parental education level and in total.
Respondents’ upward mobility by parental education group
Native parents’ education Migrant parent’s education
Illiterate (%) ISCED 0–2 (%) ISCED 3–4 (%) Total (%) Illiterate (%) ISCED 0–2 (%) ISCED 3–4 (%) Total (%)
AT – 79.8 22.1 44.4 – 63.8 27.5 47.1
BE 100 71.2 47.5 62.1 100 75.2 40.0 71.4
CH 100 83.8 27.1 37.5 100 92.9 27.2 61.6
CZ 100 90.0 23.9 65.8 100 76.5 27.8 68.9
DE 100 85.0 34.4 39.6 – 92.6 32.3 53.6
EE – 83.6 29.4 48.5 – 82.3 26.3 44.8
FR 100 80.3 57.9 77.1 100 82.6 57.9 82.1
HR 100 68.3 21.2 48.3 100 70.1 28.4 54.8
LU 100 58.0 26.5 40.3 100 71.3 24.4 58.7
LV 75 79.8 31.6 52.4 – 83.5 20.5 46.7
UK 100 85.5 44.0 71.8 100 96.5 69.2 90.5
Authors’ calculations are based on 2011 EU-SILC data. The percentages indicate the proportion of upwardly mobile respondents given the (highest)
education level of their parents. Respondents whose parents have reached the highest education level (ISCED 5–6) are excluded from the analysis.
Country- codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, EE = Estonia, FR = France, HR = Croatia,
LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, UK = United Kingdom.
9We prefer Bayesian techniques to frequentist analyses because inference based on the latter is often complicated in small samples. For more information on
Bayesian techniques see Koop (2003).
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where the posterior density is proportional to the
likelihood function times the prior density.10
The posterior mean for variable k, is calculated as
EðβkjyÞ ¼
1
S
XS
s¼1
βsk; (2)
where S is the number of draws from the posterior.
p-Values for each parameter, pk, can be derived either as
pk ¼ 2F EðβkjyÞsdðβkjyÞ
; S
 
; (3)
where FðÞ is the distribution function of the Student’s
t-distribution with S degrees of freedom11 and
sdðβkjyÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
S
XS
s¼1
ðβskÞ2  EðβkjyÞ2
vuut ;
or alternatively, we can obtain the p-values numeri-
cally as
pk ¼
1
S
XS
s¼1
I
βsk
EðβkjyÞ
> 0
 
; (4)
where I is an indicator function.12
Logit results
The results of the (Bayesian) logit estimations that
explain educational upward mobility are reported in
Table 3. In a first, naïve approach, we account for a
respondent’s migration background by including a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the respon-
dent’s parents are born in another country as the
single regressor. The results are reported in the
upper panel of the table. The results suggest that
migrants’ descendants have a significantly higher
probability of being upwardly mobile than their
native counterparts in seven countries (Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, France, Croatia,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom). Only in
Latvia are migrants’ children less likely to be
upwardly mobile than natives’ children. For Austria,
the Czech Republic and Estonia, we do not detect a
statistically significant difference between the mobi-
lity rates of the migrant and native samples.
Next, in order to investigate whether the detected
difference in upward mobility between the two
groups is accounted for by a person’s socioeconomic
background, we control for individual, parental and
household characteristics, as well as potential cohort
effects. In particular, we consider the respondents’
birth year and gender; their parents’ characteristics
(parents’ age at childbirth and its square, parental
age difference and an indicator of whether the
mother was out of labour force when the respondent
was 14); parental education (education levels of both
parents and of the more highly educated parent)13;
household characteristics at age 14 (number of
adults and children in the household); and the
household financial situation at age 14 (financial
situation of the household and its interaction with
the highest parental education level). We add two
dummy variables equal to one if a respondent was
born in the 50s or 60s, respectively, with the 70s and
80s being the base category.14 The results are
reported in the lower panel of Table 3.
Once we control for a person’s socioeconomic
background, the mobility gap between natives’ and
migrants’ descendants turns insignificant everywhere
but in Latvia and the United Kingdom. Thus, we find
that in most countries, individual, parental and
household characteristics are important drivers of
the observed mobility patterns. While the sign of the
effects of birth year, cohort and gender on the prob-
ability of being upwardly mobile is country-specific,
an older age of the mother at childbirth has a sig-
nificantly positive effect on the probability of her
children reaching a higher education than their par-
ents, however with decreasing rate (as indicated by
10For prior information we use three distinct specifications. One is an uninformative prior with mean and precision equal to 0. The other two prior
specifications use information obtained from frequentist logit regressions. More specifically, we estimate logit regressions on the pooled samples of natives
and second-generation migrants for each country, using the resulting parameter estimates as prior means and the inverse of the standard errors obtained
from the frequentist estimations divided by 1e6 and 1e4, respectively, as prior precision. We rely on Gibbs sampling and run three Markov chains, one for
each definition of the prior density, for which convergence is evaluated using Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) convergence diagnostic (the diagnostics can be
found in the supplementary material (online appendix). Inference is based on a combination of the three chains, leading to a random sample from the
posterior of s ¼ 1; . . . ; S draws. Our estimations are conducted in R using the package ‘BayesLogit’ (see Polson, Scott, and Windle 2013; Polson and Scott
2011). For each model we run three Markov chains with 20,000 iterations each, after a burn-in of 5000 and a thinning of 100, resulting in S ¼ 600.
11We adjust S for potential autocorrelation in the Markov chain.
12That is, counting the share of draws for which βsk is equally signed as its posterior mean EðβkjyÞ.
13With including the education level of the more highly educated parent additionally, we account for the fact that if the parents already have a high
education level it is harder for a person to surpass this level than if the parents have a very low education level. We expect the coefficient of this education
threshold effect to be negative.
14The respondents in our sample are all born between 1951 and 1986 (around 31% in the 50s, 34% in the 60s and 36% in the 70s or 80s).
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the negative effect of the squared term). A similar
pattern is visible for the father’s age at childbirth,
however in a smaller number of countries and to a
quantitatively lesser extent. The effect of a larger age
difference between the respondent’s parents is consis-
tently negative, whenever it is statistically significant.
The mother’s labour market status when the respon-
dent was 14 years old plays a significant role in
Belgium and the Czech Republic – being out of the
labour force contributes to a lower probability of
upward mobility in these countries. Very striking is
the positive and statistically significant effect of a
higher education level of both the mother and the
father, which is in line with the findings of the large
literature that finds that a higher parental education
has a positive impact on the education level of chil-
dren. The education level of the more highly educated
parent, which picks up the education threshold effect,
has a negative coefficient, as expected. Furthermore, a
bigger household size when the respondent was
14 years old is significantly negatively related to edu-
cational upward mobility in most countries, as evi-
denced by the negative parameters for the number of
children and the number of adults in the household.
Finally, a better financial situation of the household
when the respondent was young is connected to a
higher educational upward mobility. This relationship
becomes smaller, though, as the education level of the
more highly educated parent increases.15
In order to obtain a more conclusive picture of
why the observed pattern in Table 3 emerges and the
difference in upward mobility between migrants’ and
natives’ children turns insignificant once controlling
for their socioeconomic background, we go one step
further and try to shed light on which factors are
responsible for explaining the higher upward mobi-
lity of migrants’ descendants in most countries (and
their lower mobility in Latvia, respectively).
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition
A prominent means for finding out which charac-
teristics explain the observed differences between
two groups, which received great attention especially
in the labour literature, is the use of Oaxaca–Blinder
decompositions (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). The
decomposition allows researchers to attribute that
part of the mobility gap which can be explained by
observable characteristics to individual variables (or
variable groups) and provide a clearer picture of the
mechanisms at work. It also allows for the identifi-
cation of that part of the gap which stems from
unobserved factors or differences in returns to char-
acteristics between the two groups.
For performing the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposi-
tions of educational mobility, we first estimate coun-
try-specific logit models for migrants’ and natives’
descendants separately. Introducing notation, the
logit model can be written as
PðY ¼ 1jXÞ ¼ ΛðX0βÞ: (5)
Equation (5) links the probability of educational
upward mobility with respect to the most highly
educated parent (i.e. Y ¼ 1) to the covariates X,
where β is the vector of posterior means (from
Equation (2)), and Λ is the distribution function of
the logistic distribution.
Standard references for the Oaxaca–Blinder
decomposition for nonlinear models are Yun
(2004) and Fairlie (2005), who suggest decomposing
the mobility gap between migrants, m, and natives,
n, (the base group) into
PðYm ¼ 1 XmÞ  PðYn ¼ 1j jXnÞ ¼
¼ ΛðXmβnÞ  ΛðXnβnÞ
h i
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
difference in characteristics
þ ΛðXmβmÞ  ΛðXmβnÞ
h i
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
difference in parameters
;
(6)
where ΛðXβÞ ¼ 1=NPNi ΛðXiβ^Þ and i is an indivi-
dual. To find the contribution of covariate k to the
difference in characteristics, ΔXk (i.e. differences in
upward mobility that can be explained by differences
in observable characteristics between natives’ and
migrants’ descendants), we follow Kaiser (2015),
who shows that the detailed decomposition can be
derived as16
15This finding suggests that offspring of financially well-endowed parents with lower education levels are especially eager to obtain a higher education level,
while this might not be true to the same extent for persons with relatively highly educated parents. Luxembourg is an exception, as especially children of
highly educated parents with a good financial situation are more often upwardly mobile.
16Yun (2004) proposes an alternative methodology to isolate the contribution of each covariate to the aggregate decomposition, which is based on the
evaluation of covariates at their means. We follow the methodology in Kaiser (2015) because it allows us to take into account the nonlinear nature of logit
models by accounting for differences also in higher order moments of X.
8 D. OBERDABERNIG AND A. SCHNEEBAUM
ΔXk ¼
1
Nn
XNn
i
1
Nm
XNm
j
ΛðXmj βnÞ  ΛðXni βnÞ
h i ðXmjk  XnikÞβnk
ðXmj  Xni Þβn
:
(7)
To overcome the identification problem present
in evaluating the effect of dummy variables in the
detailed decomposition (see Yun 2005), we include
dummy variables only in variable groups (e.g. we
report the effect of all cohort dummies together
rather than reporting the effect of each cohort
separately).
Decomposition results
Upward mobility
Table 4 shows the results of this decomposition
analysis for the probability of respondents of obtain-
ing a higher education level than their more highly
educated parent. The upper panel of the table
reports the upward mobility of second-generation
migrants and natives and the difference in mobility
between the two groups (mobility gap). It also shows
how much of this gap can be explained by differ-
ences in observable characteristics between the
groups (explained part) and which part remains
unexplained. The lower panel of the table shows
the contribution of individual variable groups to
the part of the mobility gap that stems from obser-
vable characteristics.17 Specifically, the variable
groups comprise birth cohort (including birth year
and cohort dummies); gender; parents’ characteris-
tics (parents’ age at birth, its square, parental age
difference and the mother’s labour market status);
education (education level of both parents and of the
more highly educated parent); household character-
istics (number of adults and children in the house-
hold when the respondent was 14); and finance
(financial situation of the household when the
respondent was 14 and its interaction with the high-
est parental education level). Apart from reporting
the contribution of each variable group to the mobi-
lity gap and the associated level of statistical signifi-
cance, the upper panel of the table also summarizes
the share of second-generation migrants and natives
whose more highly educated parent did not yet
reach the highest education level (see the percen-
tages in square brackets).
The results of the decomposition indicate that the
greater probability of migrants’ children of reaching
a higher education class than their parents is statis-
tically significant in seven of 11 countries (Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, France, Croatia, Luxembourg
and the United Kingdom). Only in Latvia, migrants’
descendants are significantly less likely to be
upwardly mobile than their native counterparts.
The contribution of the difference in observable
characteristics between immigrants’ and natives’
children (the explained part) is highly statistically
significant in all of these countries, while the con-
tribution of differences in returns to characteristics
(the unexplained part) exhibits much lower signifi-
cance levels or is even statistically insignificant (with
the exception of Latvia and the United Kingdom,
where significance levels are higher than 5%).18
In the majority of countries, the difference in
mobility between immigrants’ and natives’ children
can in large part be explained by the difference in
parental education between the groups. Whenever
migrants are more often (less often) upwardly mobile,
their parents’ education significantly contributes to
this higher (lower) mobility. To analyse these patterns
in more detail, we can compare them with the results
of the logit regressions for natives (which form the
base group for the decomposition), reported in
Table B1 in Appendix B.19 Greater education for the
mother and the father is related to higher upward
mobility of their offspring (see the positive effects of
the mother’s and the father’s education). A higher
threshold set by the education level of the most highly
educated parent, however, decreases the probability of
17To keep the interpretation simple, we form groups of individual variables and report the contribution of each group to the part of the mobility gap that is
based on the difference in observable characteristics. The results of the detailed decomposition, which summarizes the contribution of each individual
variable, are reported in Table B3 in Appendix B.
18The results reported in the table should be interpreted as in the following examples. In Belgium, migrants’ children are 9.4 percentage points more likely
than natives’ children to surpass their parents’ education level. Differences in characteristics between natives and second-generation migrants explain 3
percentage points (about 40%) of this mobility gap. Due to unobserved factors, which explain the remaining part of the gap, migrants’ children have a 6.3
percentage points higher probability of being upwardly mobile. In Latvia, by contrast, migrants’ children are 5.7 percentage points less likely than their
native peers to surpass their parents in terms of education. While differences in characteristics between migrants’ and natives’ children account for a 1.2
percentage point lower probability of upward mobility, it is unobserved factors that drive the bigger part of the lower mobility of second-generation
migrants (4.5 percentage points or about 80% of the mobility gap). The same interpretation applies to the results for individual variables or variable
groups.
19The results for second-generation migrants are reported in Table B2 in Appendix B.
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a person being upwardly mobile (see the negative
effects of the highest parental education).
Quantitatively the negative effect of the education
threshold is larger than the positive effect of parental
education and, thus, it outweighs the latter. Because
in most countries in our sample (except for the Baltic
states) migrant parents are on average less highly
educated than their native counterparts, the lower
threshold that this implies for upward mobility is an
important contributor to the higher mobility of
migrants’ children as compared to those of natives
in these countries, which is in line with other litera-
ture (Van Ours and Veenman 2003). For the Baltic
states, in which native parents have on average lower
education levels than migrants, the opposite applies
(see descriptive statistics in Table A2 in Appendix A).
In most countries in our sample, parental education is
also quantitatively the largest contributor to the mobi-
lity gap between natives’ and migrants’ children.
Household characteristics make the biggest differ-
ence in the probability of upward mobility for
migrants’ and natives’ descendants in Estonia and
France. Their effect is statistically significant also for
most other countries in our sample. In particular,
living in relatively large households at age 14 (espe-
cially with many other children) shrinks the higher
probability of a person being upwardly mobile. The
larger household sizes of migrant households as
compared to natives in Belgium, the Czech
Republic, France, Croatia and the United Kingdom
make it more difficult for migrants’ descendants to
be upwardly mobile (as in, for example, Lindahl
2008). The opposite is true in Austria, Switzerland
and the Baltic countries, where in our sample house-
hold sizes of migrants are on average smaller than
those of natives, which is related to greater mobility
for the migrants.
In Latvia, it is differences in the gender composi-
tion between the groups that plays the biggest role in
explaining the mobility gap observed in the data. In
this country (like in Estonia and Belgium), women
are more likely than men to have reached a higher
education level than their parents. The lower pro-
portion of women among second-generation
migrants in comparison to the sample of native
respondents contributes to the overall lower mobility
of second-generation migrants in those countries. In
all other countries in our sample, male respondents
are more likely to be upwardly mobile. Thus, the
higher proportion of men (women) among natives’
descendants in Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic,
Germany and Croatia (France and Luxembourg)
explains the observed mobility patterns.
The birth cohort of the respondents and their age
contributes to a higher upward mobility of migrants’
children in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
United Kingdom and the Baltic countries, and to
lower mobility in the Czech Republic. In the Czech
Republic, a higher probability of being upwardly
mobile of younger persons, together with the on
average older age of second-generation migrants
makes it more difficult for them to be upwardly
mobile. By contrast, in Belgium, France,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, migrants’
children are on average younger than their native
peers (they are born in later birth-cohorts). The
higher mobility of younger individuals in those
countries adds to the higher probability of being
upwardly mobile for migrants’ descendants.20 In
the Baltic countries, individuals who are born in
the 50s and 60s are more likely to be upwardly
mobile than persons born in later cohorts. Thus,
the on average older age of migrants’ descendants
in those countries explains the positive contribution
to them being upwardly mobile.
Parental characteristics contribute to the higher
mobility of migrants’ descendants positively in
Germany, Croatia and Latvia, and negatively in
Belgium, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg.
Which characteristics drive this pattern in each spe-
cific case can be analysed in more detail by consult-
ing the results of the detailed decomposition
reported in Table B3 in Appendix B. Often the
mother’s age, her labour market status and the par-
ental age difference are important drivers of the
negative effects, while for the positive effects a large
part stems from the parental age difference and the
father’s age. Finally, the financial situation of the
household usually remains an insignificant contribu-
tor to the mobility gap (with the exception of the
United Kingdom, where it contributes to a higher
upward mobility of second-generation migrants).
20More specifically, it is the younger age of second-generation migrants in France and the United Kingdom that explains their higher mobility, while in
Belgium cohort effects have a larger impact. In Luxembourg, it is a combination of both effects.
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Turning to the unexplained part of the mobility
differences, we see that this part is statistically sig-
nificant (although only at the 10% level) and posi-
tively relates to higher mobility for migrants in five
countries in our sample (Belgium, Switzerland,
France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom).
Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1994) raise the idea
that persons who are more motivated to succeed
might select themselves into migration. Such selec-
tion, and the higher motivation of persons with a
migration background that it implies, would be
reflected in a positive unexplained component of
the mobility gap. Only in Latvia is the unexplained
part statistically significant and negative, which
could be driven by return migration of more able
second-generation migrants.21
All in all, parental education is the most influen-
tial factor in explaining mobility differences between
natives’ and migrants’ children in most countries.
Whenever migrants’ children are upwardly mobile
more often than natives’, it is in large part because
their parents started out with relatively low educa-
tion levels. The literature shows that children’s suc-
cess in school depends largely on their parents’
education levels, which are in turn related to the
levels of human, social and financial capitals from
which the children can benefit (Haveman and Wolfe
1995). Thus, although empirical studies often find
that migrants’ academic success is lower than
natives’ (Riphahn 2003; Colding 2006; Schneeweis
2011), we show that the children of migrants in the
last generation, who grew up in homes with fewer
resources than their native peers in many countries,
were still able to narrow the education gap with
natives’ children.
Downward mobility
In order to draw a more comprehensive picture of
whether the patterns found so far imply that the
education gap between natives and second-
generation migrants is narrowing, we repeat our
analysis from above focusing on the probability of
migrants’ and natives’ descendants reaching a lower
education level than their more highly educated par-
ent. If migrants’ children are more likely to be down-
wardly mobile, the implication of a narrowing gap
based on the fact that they are more likely to be
upwardly mobile at the same time (as shown in
section ‘Upward mobility’) would be nullified.
Table 5 presents the results of the Oaxaca–Blinder
decomposition focusing on educational downward
mobility.22
In Germany, France and Luxembourg, migrants’
descendants are significantly less likely to be down-
wardly mobile than their native peers, while in
Estonia the opposite applies. Differences in observa-
ble characteristics between the children of natives
and migrants are significant contributors to the
mobility gap in all of these countries. Additionally
to this explained part of the mobility gap, in
Germany and Estonia also the unexplained part of
the decomposition is statistically significant.
Concerning the contribution of different variable
groups to the mobility gap explained by observable
characteristics, we find that, as in the analysis of
upward mobility, parental education is the largest
contributor to this difference in most countries. In
all countries in which the explained difference is
negative (positive), the gap is driven in large part
by differences in parental education between natives’
and migrants’ children. The more detailed decom-
position results in Table B4 in Appendix B show that
this is again driven by the threshold effect of educa-
tion, which suggests that the on average lower edu-
cation level of migrant parents in most countries
makes it less likely for their children to reach even
lower education levels. For Switzerland and Latvia,
the birth cohort of the respondent turns out to have
the quantitatively largest impact on the explained
part of the mobility difference. However, in these
21Hazans, Trapeznikova, and Rastrigina (2008) point out that between 1991 and 2002, 17% of the minority population in Latvia left the country. If ability
selection lead to the emigration of more able persons, as suggested by Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1994), this might explain the negative unexplained part
for Latvia. An alternative explanation might be the transition from central planning to a market economy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its
resulting effects on the education system. During the transition, the Latvian education system stopped offering courses in Russian for the large proportion
of Russian-speaking minorities (42% in 2002) to replacing them with courses in the national language. At the same time, returns to education increased
and access constraints to higher education were removed, resulting in higher demand for tertiary education among the native population. The two effects
together have potentially contributed to a falling ratio of tertiary graduation rates between the minority and native population (see Hazans, Trapeznikova,
and Rastrigina 2008, for details). We leave an analysis of which of the two potential explanations account for the observed pattern in Latvia to future
research.
22Because of the small number of downwardly mobile second-generation migrants in Belgium, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (3, 1 and 9,
respectively) we had to exclude these countries from this analysis. Descriptive statistics for this subsample (and also for the following analyses) and a
summary of the results from the logit regressions can be found in the online appendix.
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countries the overall difference in downward mobi-
lity between migrants’ children and their native
peers is statistically insignificant.
Upward mobility conditioned on parental education
Our results thus far suggest that in most countries in
which we detect a statistically significant difference
in mobility, migrants’ children have an advantage:
they are more often upwardly mobile and less often
downwardly mobile than their native peers. The only
exceptions are the Baltic countries where migrants
are on average more highly educated than natives.
We also uncovered that an important factor for
explaining these mobility differences is the threshold
implied by the education level of the more highly
educated parent. This raises the question: are sec-
ond-generation migrants upwardly mobile more
often only because they have a lower threshold to
surpass, or would they be more mobile also if their
parents were equally educated as natives?
In order to perform this analysis, we restrict our
sample to respondents whose more highly educated
parents have the same highest education level (ISCED
0–2) and repeat the analysis from before on the
restricted sample. In this way we compare mobility
patterns of natives’ and migrants’ children that face
the same education threshold to surpass.23 The
results, which are reported in Table 6, suggest that
once we restrict our sample to observations with the
same parental education, migrants’ children are sig-
nificantly less often upwardly mobile in the Czech
Republic, and significantly more often upwardly
mobile in Switzerland and Luxembourg. In all three
countries, differences in observable characteristics
between the groups are statistically significant contri-
butors to the overall mobility gap. In the Czech
Table 5. Decomposition results for downward mobility.
Austria Switzerland Germany Estonia France Croatia Luxembourg Latvia
Probability of downward mobility
Migrants 15.094 *** 6.309 *** 7.035 *** 20.728 *** 2.696 *** 6.383 *** 6.704 *** 14.800 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
100% 94.6% 100% 100% 90.7% 99.6% 99.4% 100%
Natives 11.425 *** 8.288 *** 14.519 *** 16.169 *** 4.589 *** 6.470 *** 13.147 *** 13.410 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
100% 99.9% 100% 100% 99.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8%
Mobility gap 3.669 −1.979 −7.484 *** 4.559 ** −1.893 * −0.087 −6.443 *** 1.390
(0.242) (0.215) (0.003) (0.028) (0.072) (0.958) (0.000) (0.394)
Explained 0.280 −0.740 *** −3.505 *** 0.611 * −2.235 *** −0.731 ** −5.458 *** −0.322
(0.370) (0.001) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.155)
Unexplained 3.389 −1.239 −3.979 *** 3.948 ** 0.342 0.644 −0.984 1.712
(0.151) (0.275) (0.001) (0.025) (0.486) (0.754) (0.380) (0.205)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth cohort 0.176 −0.470 *** −0.175 ** −0.759 *** −0.048 ** −0.090 −1.710 *** −0.511 ***
(0.113) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.049) (0.241) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender 0.122 ** −0.087 *** −0.040 *** −0.198 *** −0.038 *** −0.012 −0.128 *** 0.499 ***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.469) (0.001) (0.000)
Parents −0.084 0.155 * −0.260 *** −0.138 −0.083 −0.188 0.360 * −0.036
(0.647) (0.067) (0.002) (0.360) (0.232) (0.230) (0.092) (0.743)
Education 0.339 *** −0.138 −2.054 *** 1.909 *** −2.421 *** −1.576 *** −8.498 *** −0.005
(0.001) (0.129) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.970)
Household −0.065 −0.262 ** 0.006 −0.197 0.021 0.844 *** −0.040 −0.218 ***
(0.332) (0.045) (0.895) (0.351) (0.808) (0.000) (0.676) (0.000)
Finance −0.207 * 0.062 −0.982 ** −0.014 0.335 0.291 * 4.558 *** −0.044
(0.056) (0.401) (0.020) (0.982) (0.368) (0.099) (0.000) (0.322)
N 4745 4395 8154 3505 8013 4609 3142 4251
N natives 4639 4078 7955 3148 7605 4374 2784 3751
N migrants 106 317 199 357 408 235 358 500
This table shows the percentage of downwardly mobile migrants’ and natives’ descendants and the contribution of characteristics to the difference between
the groups. Migrants (natives) refers to the downward mobility of migrants’ (natives’) descendants. Explained (unexplained) refers to the part of the
mobility gap arising from differences in characteristics (parameters). The p-value based on Equation (3) is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * signify
significance of the effects at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively, based on Equation (4). The percentages in the square brackets indicate which share of the
total sample of natives’ and migrants’ descendants is included in the analysis. The remaining share is excluded because the parents of these respondents
are in the lowest education category. The variable group with the largest contribution to the explained part of mobility gap in each country is highlighted
in bold.
23We had to exclude Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom from the analysis because of the small sample size for migrants (45 in Austria) or small
number of migrants’ children who are not upwardly mobile (four and three cases in Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively). We exclude all
parental education variables and its interaction with the financial situation from the regressions because of the multicollinearity induced by conditioning
on the same parental education level.
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Republic and Luxembourg also unexplained factors
are marginally statistically significant.
Turning to the contribution of the different variable
groups to the mobility gap explained by differences in
observable characteristics, birth cohorts account for
the largest part in the majority of countries. In
Switzerland and the Czech Republic, it is household
size (especially the number of children in a household,
see detailed results in Table B5 in Appendix B) that
contribute the largest part to the mobility gaps, and in
Estonia it is differences in the financial situation of
households when the respondent was 14 years old.
Two classes upward mobility conditioned on
parental education
Finally, we shortly compare the probability of
migrants’ and natives’ descendants of surpassing
their more highly educated parent by two education
classes. The idea behind this analysis is that if
migrants are also more likely to jump two classes,
they are even more likely to narrow the education
gap with natives.24 Table 7 shows that in the United
Kingdom, migrants’ children are significantly more
likely than natives’ to surpass their more highly
educated parent by two education classes.25 This
mobility difference cannot be explained by observa-
ble characteristics but is driven by unobservable
factors. In all other countries in our sample, the
mobility gap between natives’ and migrants’ descen-
dants is statistically insignificant. However, there is
some indication that in Belgium and France obser-
vable characteristics (mainly larger household sizes)
would explain a lower (two-class) upward mobility
of second-generation migrants, while in Switzerland,
Germany, Estonia and Luxembourg the opposite is
true (mainly explained by household size in
Switzerland and Estonia, parental characteristics in
Germany and birth cohorts in Luxembourg).
Table 6. Decomposition results for upward mobility conditioned on parental education.
Belgium Switzerland Czech Republic Estonia France Croatia Luxembourg Latvia
Probability of upward mobility conditioned on parental education
Migrants 75.248 *** 92.913 *** 76.543 *** 82.278 *** 82.647 *** 70.073 *** 71.250 *** 83.529 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
69% 38% 77% 22% 76% 58% 67% 34%
Natives 71.196 *** 83.810 *** 89.965 *** 83.612 *** 80.302 *** 68.255 *** 57.996 *** 79.787 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
45% 15% 56% 27% 72% 53% 39% 35%
Mobility gap 4.052 9.104 *** −13.422 *** −1.334 2.345 1.818 13.254 *** 3.742
(0.381) (0.008) (0.000) (0.760) (0.290) (0.657) (0.000) (0.249)
Explained −0.662 4.919 *** −6.129 *** 0.379 1.144 ** 1.072 7.038 *** 1.650 ***
(0.532) (0.004) (0.000) (0.548) (0.012) (0.119) (0.000) (0.004)
Unexplained 4.714 4.185 −7.293 * −1.713 1.200 0.746 6.216 * 2.093
(0.200) (0.121) (0.057) (0.580) (0.551) (0.833) (0.073) (0.499)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth cohort 3.256 *** 2.265 −1.524 *** −0.047 2.951 *** 1.328 *** 6.288 *** 2.159 ***
(0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.860) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender −0.024 0.434 *** −0.349 *** 0.119 ** 0.229 *** −0.126 *** 0.885 *** −0.568 ***
(0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Parents −1.344 * −0.082 −0.661 ** −0.401 −0.047 1.114 *** −1.137 ** 0.455
(0.056) (0.900) (0.041) (0.384) (0.876) (0.001) (0.040) (0.251)
Household −0.653 ** 2.337 *** −3.489 *** 0.250 −1.805 *** −0.379 0.232 −0.081
(0.041) (0.010) (0.000) (0.515) (0.000) (0.258) (0.525) (0.579)
Finance −1.897 *** −0.035 −0.106 0.459 * −0.188 *** −0.864 *** 0.766 *** −0.325 *
(0.000) (0.918) (0.215) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.086)
N 1882 757 3509 915 5833 2446 1328 1486
N natives 1781 630 3428 836 5493 2309 1088 1316
N migrants 101 127 81 79 340 137 240 170
This table shows the percentage of upwardly mobile migrants’ and natives’ descendants and the contribution of characteristics to the difference between
the groups. The sample is restricted to individuals whose more highly educated parent achieved an education level corresponding to ISCED 0–2. Migrants
(natives) refers to the upward mobility of migrants’ (natives’) descendants. Explained (unexplained) refers to the part of the mobility gap arising from
differences in characteristics (parameters). The p-value based on Equation (3) is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * signify significance of the effects at the 1%,
5%, 10% level, respectively, based on Equation (4). The percentages in the square brackets indicate which share of the total sample of natives’ and
migrants’ descendants is included in the analysis. The remaining share is excluded because the highest educated parent of these respondents is not in the
ISCED 0–2 category. The variable group with the largest contribution to the explained part of mobility gap in each country is highlighted in bold.
24Here too we restrict our sample to persons whose more highly educated parent reached an education level corresponding to ISCED 0–2. Austria, the Czech
Republic and Croatia had to be excluded from the analysis because of the small number of migrants’ descendants who surpass their more highly educated
parent by two education levels (1, 7 and 8, respectively).
25The results of the detailed decomposition are reported in Table B6 in Appendix B.
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All in all, our results suggest that the higher
educational upward mobility of second-generation
migrants that has been found in many European
countries can be, to a large extent, explained by the
lower threshold implied by the on average lower
education level of their parents (as in Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, France, Croatia,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom). Parental
education also explains the lower downward mobi-
lity of migrants’ children that is detected in
Germany, France and Luxembourg. Once we
restrict our sample to persons that face a similar
education threshold, the significant difference in
mobility patterns disappears in many countries.
Second-generation migrants are then more often
upwardly mobile only in Switzerland and
Luxembourg, and surpass their parents by two edu-
cation levels more often than natives only in the
United Kingdom. On the other hand, we detect a
higher upward mobility of natives in Latvia and a
lower downward mobility of natives in Estonia,
countries in which migrant parents are on average
more highly educated than native parents. Thus, a
similar catch-up process of natives seems to take
place in those countries. Once we restrict our sam-
ple to individuals with similar parental education, a
higher upward mobility of natives is only detected
in the Czech Republic.
Although data limitations impede the analysis of
the patterns found here in further detail, this would
be a promising direction for future research, which
could focus on one specific country and dig deeper
into what drives differences in educational mobility
after accounting for parental education. In any case,
the results here challenge the idea of more highly
motivated migrants. Instead, the research shows that
the often lower threshold that migrants’ children
need to surpass in order to be upwardly mobile is
the main driver of mobility differences to natives in
most countries. Beyond the lower education of the
parents, we find that some personal and household-
level characteristics, in particular household size at
Table 7. Decomposition results for upward mobility of two education levels conditioned on parental education.
Belgium Switzerland Germany Estonia France Luxembourg Latvia UK
Probability of upward mobility
Migrants 22.772 *** 17.323 *** 31.481 *** 20.253 *** 28.824 *** 15.417 *** 14.118 *** 46.512 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
69% 38% 77% 22% 76% 58% 67% 34%
Natives 25.660 *** 13.333 *** 26.972 *** 19.856 *** 25.196 *** 11.673 *** 15.805 *** 29.926 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
45% 15% 56% 27% 72% 53% 39% 35%
Mobility gap −2.887 3.990 4.509 0.397 3.628 3.744 −1.688 16.586 ***
(0.517) (0.238) (0.479) (0.933) (0.136) (0.111) (0.569) (0.001)
Explained −2.379 ** 4.528 ** 4.860 ** 1.227 ** −1.225 *** 5.870 *** −0.441 0.028
(0.020) (0.042) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000) (0.223) (0.971)
Unexplained −0.508 −0.539 −0.351 −0.830 4.853 ** −2.126 −1.246 16.557 ***
(0.889) (0.894) (0.950) (0.729) (0.039) (0.401) (0.627) (0.001)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth cohort 0.013 0.473 1.488 0.179 1.835 *** 5.629 *** 0.050 0.712 ***
(0.985) (0.791) (0.365) (0.244) (0.000) (0.000) (0.768) (0.007)
Gender −0.085 0.332 *** 0.622 *** −0.017 −0.153 ** 0.241 −0.429 *** −0.112
(0.106) (0.004) (0.000) (0.682) (0.023) (0.105) (0.000) (0.124)
Parents −0.936 0.609 2.920 *** 0.283 −0.137 −0.836 * 0.251 1.087 **
(0.170) (0.476) (0.008) (0.428) (0.651) (0.077) (0.446) (0.012)
Household −1.016 *** 2.444 ** 0.412 0.586 *** −2.613 *** 0.587 ** −0.114 * −1.681 ***
(0.004) (0.012) (0.233) (0.007) (0.000) (0.017) (0.081) (0.002)
Finance −0.354 0.671 −0.582 0.197 −0.158 *** 0.240 −0.202 * 0.023 *
(0.424) (0.102) (0.110) (0.237) (0.000) (0.170) (0.082) (0.084)
N 1882 757 599 915 5833 1328 1486 2375
N natives 1781 630 545 836 5493 1088 1316 2289
N migrants 101 127 54 79 340 240 170 86
This table shows the percentage of migrants’ and natives’ descendants who surpass their more highly educated parent by two education classes and the
contribution of characteristics to the difference between the groups. The sample is restricted to individuals whose more highly educated parent achieved
an education level corresponding to ISCED 0–2. Migrants (natives) refers to the upward mobility of migrants’ (natives’) descendants. Explained
(unexplained) refers to the part of the mobility gap arising from differences in characteristics (parameters). The p-value based on Equation (3) is shown
in parentheses. ***, **, * signify significance of the effects at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively, based on Equation (4). The percentages in the square
brackets indicate which share of the total sample of natives’ and migrants’ descendants is included in the analysis. The remaining share is excluded
because the highest educated parent of these respondents is not in the ISCED 0–2 category. The variable group with the largest contribution to the
explained part of mobility gap in each country is highlighted in bold.
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age 14, also matters (though less so). Regardless of
the reason, though, the education gap appears to
have been closing in most countries across the last
two generations.
IV. Conclusion and discussion
The analysis in this article provides clear evidence
of a narrowing gap in educational attainment
levels between natives and immigrants across the
two most recent generations. Migrant parents are
less educated than native parents in many
European countries, but their children are often
able to surpass their parents’ education levels and
get closer to the level of education achieved by
their native peers. In most countries, the socio-
economic background of native and migrant par-
ents is an important determinant of the mobility
differences between their children. Apart from
parental education, which is the quantitatively
most important contributor to the mobility differ-
ence in most countries, the size of the household
when the respondent was 14 turns out to be an
important driver of differences in upward mobility
between the two groups in most of the countries
in our sample, while the financial situation of the
household at that time is more important for
explaining patterns of downward mobility. In
many countries, the age structure and the gender
composition of the two groups also contributes to
the observed mobility differences, while parental
characteristics are statistically insignificant drivers
of mobility gaps in about half of the countries
analysed.
In order to see the extent to which second-gen-
eration migrants’ greater educational mobility is dri-
ven by the lower threshold that they have to pass
(because of the on average lower educational attain-
ment levels of their parents in many countries), we
provide additional information on the mobility dif-
ference between the children of similarly educated
natives and migrants. Evidence points towards a
higher educational upward mobility of migrants’
children in Switzerland and Luxembourg, whereas
their mobility is significantly lower than that of their
native peers in the Czech Republic.
The analysis presented in this article suggests that
in most countries in our sample, the difference in
educational attainment between natives and second-
generation migrants has been narrowing across the
two most recent generations. If this process persists
over future generations, people with a migration
background might soon have comparable education
levels to the native population.
The findings in this article have important implica-
tions for the design of immigration policy, which often
focuses on the on-average lower education level of
immigrants into western European countries.
Empirical studies often find a higher use of social
welfare assistance of lower educated individuals (see
Barrett and McCarthy 2007; Blume and Verner 2007;
Boeri 2010; Pellizzari 2013; Huber and Oberdabernig
2016), which spurs arguments against the inflow of
unskilled immigrants. Although the effects of educa-
tion on welfare receipt are usually small and many
studies find an only small fiscal impact of immigration
as a share of gross domestic product in most countries,
unskilled immigration remains a concern (see OECD
2013, and studies cited therein). Reinforcing the argu-
ment that descendants of immigrants are likely to
provide a strong positive fiscal contribution to the
state budget (see Lee and Miller 1997; cited by
OECD 2013), our study shows that if the patterns
detected for the last two generations continue, the
potentially negative effect of migrants’ lower educa-
tion on their net fiscal position eventually dies out in
the long run, which would lead to similar conclusions.
Further, to the extent to which policy makers want
to speed up the convergence of migrants’ to natives’
education levels over generations, they could consider
policies which have been shown to reduce interge-
nerational persistence in educational outcomes, such
as later tracking, early school entry and greater access
to pre-school and kindergarten programmes (Bauer
and Riphahn 2006a; Schütz, Ursprung, andWößmann
2008; Bauer and Riphahn 2009a). These policies could
be particularly helpful to migrants’ descendants, given
that their parents are often less educated than native-
born parents.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Data appendix
Descriptive statistics
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of all variables for the full sample.
AT BE CH CZ DE EE FR HR LU LV UK
Natives’ children
Birth year 1966 1967 1966 1967 1965 1968 1967 1966 1966 1968 1966
Cohort 50s 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.28
Cohort 60s 0.39 0.31 0.37 0.27 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.34
Male (d) 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.45
Father’s age at birth 30.32 30.08 31.58 28.19 29.63 30.12 29.60 29.53 31.11 29.68 30.10
Mother’s age at birth 26.93 27.60 28.39 25.00 26.85 27.40 26.96 26.01 27.78 27.36 27.32
Age diff. of parents 4.22 3.20 4.05 3.62 3.56 4.09 3.50 4.22 4.12 3.82 3.56
Mother out of labour f. (d) 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.08 0.44 0.07 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.08 0.26
Mothers’ education 1.46 1.56 1.59 1.34 1.82 1.82 1.27 1.29 1.38 1.71 1.36
Fathers’ education 1.77 1.67 1.93 1.42 2.20 1.73 1.31 1.51 1.64 1.61 1.56
Highest parental educ. 1.83 1.82 2.00 1.54 2.26 1.98 1.43 1.55 1.71 1.83 1.69
# of adults in hh 2.71 2.34 2.50 2.16 2.26 2.27 2.40 2.60 2.58 2.16 2.28
# of children in hh 2.51 2.52 2.51 2.21 2.19 2.28 1.58 2.19 2.34 2.31 2.28
Financial situation 3.72 4.39 4.36 4.04 4.13 4.01 3.96 3.67 4.24 4.11 4.03
Birth year 1970 1971 1969 1962 1964 1967 1970 1968 1973 1966 1969
Cohort 50s 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.53 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.31 0.17
Cohort 60s 0.18 0.22 0.39 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.37
Male (d) 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.40
Father’s age at birth 31.75 31.82 31.19 28.76 31.28 29.08 32.42 30.50 30.94 29.88 31.95
Mother’s age at birth 28.10 27.42 27.75 26.29 28.07 27.68 27.62 27.26 27.41 27.95 28.65
Age diff. of parents 4.48 5.13 4.28 3.66 3.96 3.18 5.26 4.05 4.42 3.28 4.45
Mother out of labour f. (d) 0.34 0.68 0.33 0.14 0.46 0.05 0.57 0.62 0.51 0.05 0.28
Mothers’ education 1.32 0.98 1.27 1.10 1.52 1.93 0.93 1.20 1.23 1.65 1.36
Fathers’ education 1.63 1.08 1.60 1.10 1.91 1.90 1.04 1.45 1.32 1.69 1.41
Highest parental educ. 1.74 1.17 1.67 1.17 1.96 2.11 1.12 1.48 1.40 1.84 1.58
# of adults in hh 2.64 2.52 2.34 2.31 2.36 2.25 2.90 2.83 2.42 2.13 2.71
# of children in hh 2.28 3.02 1.98 3.04 2.11 1.89 2.24 2.45 2.47 2.22 2.85
Financial situation 3.91 3.85 4.28 3.80 3.95 4.04 3.75 3.54 4.14 4.12 4.04
Age difference refers to the absolute age difference between the parents. Mother out of labour force is an indicator for whether the respondents’ mother
was in or out of the labour force when the respondent was 14. # of persons in the household refers to the number of adults and children, respectively, in
the household in which the respondents lived when they were 14 years old. Financial situation refers to the financial situation of the household in which
the respondents lived when they were 14 years old. A detailed definition of variables can be found in the variable Table A3. Country-codes: AT = Austria,
BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, EE = Estonia, FR = France, HR = Croatia, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, UK = United
Kingdom.
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of all variables for the sample used for upward mobility.
AT BE CH CZ DE EE FR HR LU LV UK
Natives’ children
Birth year 1966 1966 1965 1966 1965 1966 1966 1965 1965 1967 1966
Cohort 50s (d) 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.30
Cohort 60s (d) 0.39 0.32 0.38 0.27 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.35
Male (d) 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.45
Fathers’ age at birth 30.36 29.98 31.56 28.14 29.51 30.59 29.62 29.47 31.04 29.76 29.98
Mothers’ age at birth 26.96 27.49 28.31 24.94 26.71 27.65 26.87 26.00 27.67 27.37 27.14
Age diff. of parents 4.26 3.23 4.11 3.63 3.58 4.34 3.59 4.19 4.17 3.91 3.62
Mother out of labour f. (d) 0.44 0.54 0.46 0.08 0.48 0.08 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.08 0.26
Mothers’ education 1.36 1.24 1.50 1.24 1.65 1.52 1.07 1.19 1.29 1.48 1.09
Fathers’ education 1.56 1.28 1.75 1.25 1.86 1.48 1.08 1.40 1.51 1.41 1.28
Highest parental educ. 1.61 1.38 1.82 1.37 1.90 1.65 1.14 1.42 1.56 1.56 1.33
# of adults in hh 2.76 2.38 2.54 2.17 2.30 2.29 2.44 2.63 2.61 2.17 2.30
# of children in hh 2.54 2.53 2.53 2.24 2.22 2.35 1.62 2.22 2.35 2.37 2.29
Financial situation 3.63 4.25 4.25 3.99 3.95 3.93 3.86 3.59 4.16 4.04 3.93
Migrants’ children
Birth year 1971 1971 1969 1961 1965 1966 1970 1968 1972 1966 1968
Cohort 50s (d) 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.54 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.08 0.33 0.18
Cohort 60s (d) 0.16 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.41
Male (d) 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.40
Fathers’ age at birth 30.87 31.94 31.13 28.71 31.35 29.05 32.48 30.55 30.72 29.81 31.77
Mothers’ age at birth 27.74 27.51 27.63 26.26 28.03 27.59 27.54 27.40 27.36 28.00 28.43
Age diff of parents 4.15 5.21 4.37 3.65 4.10 3.32 5.37 4.00 4.32 3.22 4.53
Mother out of labour f. (d) 0.34 0.69 0.31 0.15 0.50 0.06 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.05 0.33
Mothers’ education 1.16 0.91 1.09 1.07 1.39 1.56 0.84 1.12 1.12 1.46 0.99
Fathers’ education 1.34 1.01 1.35 1.07 1.61 1.53 0.92 1.34 1.20 1.46 1.16
Highest parental educ. 1.46 1.08 1.42 1.14 1.65 1.67 0.99 1.37 1.27 1.58 1.19
# of adults in hh 2.66 2.51 2.40 2.32 2.38 2.28 2.95 2.89 2.42 2.15 2.72
# of children in hh 2.31 3.06 1.95 3.06 2.20 1.95 2.27 2.43 2.51 2.32 2.89
Financial situation 3.72 3.82 4.21 3.78 3.90 3.95 3.71 3.49 4.07 4.06 3.88
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample used for investigating differences in upward mobility, that is, after excluding respondents whose more
highly educated parent had already reached the highest education level. Age difference refers to the absolute age difference between the parents. Mother
out of labour force is an indicator for whether the respondents’ mother was in or out of the labour force when the respondent was 14. # of persons in the
household refers to the number of adults and children, respectively, in the household in which the respondents lived when they were 14 years old.
Financial situation refers to the financial situation of the household in which the respondents lived when they were 14 years old. A detailed definition of
variables can be found in the variable Table A3. Country-codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany,
EE = Estonia, FR = France, HR = Croatia, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, UK = United Kingdom.
Table A3. Variable definitions.
Variable Variable definition
Upward mobility Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reaches a higher education class than the highest educated parent.
Downward mobility Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reaches a lower education class than the highest educated parent.
Birth year Birth year of the respondent.
Cohort 50s (d) Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is born between 1950 and 1959.
Cohort 60s (d) Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is born between 1960 and 1969.
Male (d) Dummy variable equal to one for male respondents.
Father’ age at birth Age of the father when the respondent was born.
Mothers’ age at birth Age of the mother when the respondent was born.
Age diff of parents Absolute value of the age difference between the parents.
Mother out of labour f. (d) Dummy variable equal to one if the respondents’ mother was out of the labour force when the respondent was 14.
Mother’s education Highest education level reached by the mother (0 ‘illiterate’, 1 ‘ISCED 0–2’, 2 ‘ISCED 3–4’; highest level 3 ‘ISCED 5–6’
excluded).
Fathers’ education Highest education level reached by the father (0 ‘illiterate’, 1 ‘ISCED 0–2’, 2 ‘ISCED 3–4’; highest level 3 ‘ISCED 5–6’
excluded).
Highest parental educ. Highest education level reached by the highest educated parent (0 ‘illiterate’, 1 ‘ISCED 0–2’, 2 ‘ISCED 3–4’; highest level 3
‘ISCED 5–6’ excluded).
# of adults in hh Number of adults living in the same household as the respondent when she/he was 14 years old.
# of children in hh Number of children living in the same household as the respondent when she/he was 14 years old.
Financial situation Financial situation of the household in which the respondent lived when she/he was 14 years old (ranging from 1 ‘very
bad’ to 6 ‘very good’).
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Dropped observations
Table A4. Sample sizes.
Full
sample
in EU-
SILC
Born in
country of
residence
Finished
education
Parental
information
available
Resulting
sample
Upward
mobility
Upward
mobility
Without
ISCED
5–6
parental
educ.
Downward
mobility
Without
illiterate
parents
Conditional
upward
mobility
Max.
ISCED
0–2
parental
educ.
N
Percentage
dropped
(%) N (%) N (%) (%) N (%) N (%) N
AT Total 13,933 −29 −10 −44 5019 −5 −16 3990 0 4745
Nat 4905 −5 −16 3903 0 4639
Mig 114 −7 −18 87 0 106
BE Total 14,300 −33 −12 −47 4458 −8 −26 3051 −54 1882
Nat 4300 −8 −27 2911 −55 1781
Mig 158 −7 −5 140 −31 101
CH Total 17,602 −39 −12 −47 4982 −11 −15 3736 0 4395 −83 757
Nat 4604 −11 −15 3455 0 4078 −85 630
Mig 378 −11 −16 281 −5 317 −62 127
CZ Total 20,629 −18 −10 −59 6247 −1 −11 5518 −43 3509
Nat 6142 −1 −11 5415 −44 3428
Mig 105 0 −2 103 −23 81
DE Total 28,644 −23 −9 −47 10,568 −23 −32 5514 0 8154
Nat 10,304 −23 −33 5361 0 7955
Mig 264 −25 −23 153 0 199
EE Total 13,426 −28 −16 −50 4071 −14 −25 2617 0 3505 −74 915
Nat 3653 −14 −24 2378 0 3148 −73 836
Mig 418 −15 −33 239 0 357 −78 79
FR Total 27,071 −28 −9 −46 9520 −15 −15 6886 −1 8013 −28 5833
Nat 8980 −15 −15 6466 0 7605 −28 5493
Mig 540 −17 −7 420 −9 408 −24 340
HR Total 16,948 −24 −9 −53 5507 −16 −8 4243 0 4609 −47 2446
Nat 5225 −16 −8 4024 0 4374 −47 2309
Mig 282 −16 −7 219 0 235 −42 137
LU Total 14,891 −57 −14 −40 3317 −5 −10 2835 0 3142 −58 1328
Nat 2938 −5 −10 2503 0 2784 −61 1088
Mig 379 −5 −8 332 −1 358 −33 240
LV Total 15,891 −28 −11 −55 4618 −8 −19 3468 0 4251 −65 1486
Nat 4079 −8 −19 3059 0 3751 −65 1316
Mig 539 −7 −18 409 0 500 −66 170
UK Total 18,670 −29 −9 −56 5315 −14 −22 3582
Nat 5145 −14 −22 3466
Mig 170 −13 −22 116
This table shows the share of observations dropped to obtain the final samples. We restrict the sample to persons born in their country of residence, with
finished education. We have to drop observations with missing information on the respondents’ parents and household characteristics at the age of 14 (i.e.
if information on parental country of birth or education is missing, if parents are coded as dead or unknown in EU-SILC or the respondent was living in a
collective household or institution). From the resulting sample, we have to drop all individuals with missing information on the dependent or independent
variables used in the empirical analysis. For the analysis of upward mobility, we exclude respondents whose more highly educated parent already reached
the highest education level (ISCED 5–6). For the analysis of downward mobility, we exclude respondents whose parents are illiterate. For the analysis of
upward mobility conditional on parental education we focus on respondents whose more highly educated parent has an education level corresponding to
ISCED 0–2. Country-codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, EE = Estonia, FR = France, HR = Croatia,
LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, UK = United Kingdom.
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Table A5. Mobility of dropped individuals due to missing values for explanatory variables.
Migrants
(%)
Natives
(%)
Bias in
mobility gap
(%)
Migrants
(%)
Natives
(%)
Bias in
mobility gap
(%)
Migrants
(%)
Natives
(%)
Bias in
mobility gap
(%)
Migrants
(%)
Natives
(%)
Bias in
mobility gap
(%)
Upward Downward Upward cond Upward 2 classes
AT 88 39 −4 0 12 1
BE 78 49 −1 83 55 −2 0 14 0
CH 54 39 1 17 9 −1 75 83 2 10 15 1
CZ 78 0 93 0
DE 39 36 3 20 13 −3 20 20 0
EE 50 43 −2 20 15 0 78 70 −2 4 17 3
FR 77 74 0 4 4 0 72 76 1 14 17 1
HR 50 52 1 5 5 0 56 65 2
LU 56 32 0 6 19 0 83 48 −1 8 4 0
LV 48 49 0 10 13 0 83 73 −1 0 5 0
UK 68 70 3 31 18 0
This table shows the mobility of individuals that are dropped from the sample because of missing observation on any of the explanatory variables that are
included in the analysis, grouped by migration background. Individuals that can per definition not be mobile in terms of education because of the parental
education level are coded as missing and thus do not influence the numbers shown in the table. Natives refers to natives’ descendants, migrants refers to
migrants’ descendants. The bias in mobility gap indicates how much larger or smaller the mobility gap detected in the data would be if those excluded
observations were included in the multivariate analysis. Negative values for the bias in mobility gap indicate a downward bias, that is, the identified
mobility gaps would be larger (or less negative) than the ones reported in the multivariate analysis (migrants’ children would be relatively more mobile
than reported); positive values indicate an upward bias, that is, mobility gaps would be smaller (or more negative) than reported (i.e. migrants’ children
would be relatively less mobile than reported). More detailed statistics are reported in the online appendix.
22 D. OBERDABERNIG AND A. SCHNEEBAUM
Ta
bl
e
B1
.L
og
it
re
su
lt
fo
r
up
w
ar
d
m
ob
ili
ty
of
na
tiv
es
’c
hi
ld
re
n.
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Cz
ec
h
Re
pu
bl
ic
G
er
m
an
y
Es
to
ni
a
Fr
an
ce
Cr
oa
tia
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
La
tv
ia
U
K
Bi
rt
h
ye
ar
−
0.
00
2
−
0.
00
1
−
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
**
*
−
0.
00
4
**
−
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
**
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
*
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.7
82
)
(0
.2
52
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
62
)
(0
.3
26
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.0
69
)
Co
ho
rt
50
s
(d
)
−
0.
08
0
**
−
0.
13
7
**
−
0.
08
6
*
0.
02
1
−
0.
07
6
*
0.
05
3
−
0.
04
1
−
0.
00
4
−
0.
08
2
0.
21
1
**
*
−
0.
03
7
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.5
41
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.3
53
)
(0
.2
38
)
(0
.9
31
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
12
)
Co
ho
rt
60
s
(d
)
−
0.
02
0
−
0.
01
5
−
0.
04
8
0.
03
6
*
−
0.
04
0
0.
06
3
*
0.
00
1
0.
03
9
−
0.
07
1
*
0.
14
0
**
*
−
0.
00
3
(0
.4
45
)
(0
.6
91
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.9
49
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
26
)
M
al
e
(d
)
0.
08
3
**
*
−
0.
04
5
**
*
0.
14
1
**
*
0.
03
3
**
*
0.
09
3
**
*
−
0.
15
9
**
*
0.
02
1
**
0.
06
1
**
*
0.
07
4
**
*
−
0.
18
2
**
*
0.
00
1
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
15
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
0.
02
0
**
0.
02
2
0.
02
9
**
0.
00
5
0.
02
2
**
0.
00
4
0.
01
7
*
−
0.
00
1
0.
03
8
**
0.
01
6
0.
02
7
**
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.5
66
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.7
23
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.9
20
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
11
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
(/
10
0)
−
0.
03
8
**
−
0.
04
1
*
−
0.
04
1
**
−
0.
01
3
−
0.
04
3
**
−
0.
00
5
−
0.
03
3
**
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
06
0
**
−
0.
02
5
−
0.
04
0
**
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.4
32
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.7
75
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.7
64
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.0
18
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
0.
00
7
0.
02
1
*
0.
02
0
**
0.
00
1
0.
01
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
02
2
**
*
0.
01
7
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
7
(0
.3
52
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.8
76
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.6
12
)
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.1
76
)
(0
.6
60
)
(0
.3
99
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
(/
10
0)
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
02
2
−
0.
02
8
*
0.
00
5
−
0.
00
5
−
0.
00
5
−
0.
00
0
−
0.
02
2
*
−
0.
01
7
−
0.
00
0
0.
01
4
(0
.7
75
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.6
65
)
(0
.7
12
)
(0
.6
84
)
(0
.9
91
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.3
62
)
(0
.9
78
)
(0
.2
34
)
Ag
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
pa
re
nt
s
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
01
0
**
0.
00
0
−
0.
00
2
−
0.
00
9
**
*
−
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
6
*
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
00
6
**
−
0.
00
5
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.8
89
)
(0
.5
73
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.4
62
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.1
48
)
M
ot
he
r
ou
t
of
la
bo
ur
f.
(d
)
0.
00
2
−
0.
04
0
**
0.
01
5
−
0.
06
4
**
*
−
0.
00
4
0.
01
6
−
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
0.
01
9
0.
02
8
−
0.
01
2
(0
.8
65
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.3
20
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
55
)
(0
.6
53
)
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.6
90
)
(0
.3
25
)
(0
.3
31
)
(0
.4
25
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
08
9
**
*
0.
07
9
**
*
0.
06
6
**
*
0.
07
6
**
*
0.
06
6
**
*
0.
16
4
**
*
0.
06
7
**
*
0.
16
2
**
*
0.
12
3
**
*
0.
15
8
**
*
0.
01
7
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
38
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
05
4
*
0.
07
6
**
0.
03
7
0.
07
4
**
*
0.
01
0
0.
06
4
**
*
0.
04
6
*
0.
14
8
**
*
0.
10
0
**
0.
10
6
**
*
−
0.
00
6
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.1
76
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
35
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
47
)
H
ig
he
st
pa
re
nt
al
ed
uc
.
−
0.
54
1
**
*
−
0.
34
9
**
*
−
0.
61
7
**
*
−
0.
52
3
**
*
−
0.
57
9
**
*
−
0.
60
9
**
*
−
0.
25
5
**
*
−
0.
49
7
**
*
−
0.
56
4
**
*
−
0.
48
2
**
*
−
0.
25
4
**
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
#
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
hh
−
0.
00
7
−
0.
01
6
**
*
−
0.
01
2
**
−
0.
03
2
**
*
−
0.
01
1
*
−
0.
01
6
**
−
0.
01
9
**
*
−
0.
02
0
**
*
−
0.
00
7
−
0.
02
6
**
*
−
0.
02
1
**
*
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.3
24
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
#
of
ad
ul
ts
in
hh
−
0.
01
1
*
−
0.
01
7
**
−
0.
02
9
**
*
−
0.
02
0
**
*
−
0.
00
9
−
0.
02
3
*
−
0.
02
5
**
*
0.
00
3
−
0.
01
9
**
−
0.
02
6
**
−
0.
04
9
**
*
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.5
75
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
00
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
itu
at
io
n
0.
03
4
*
0.
04
7
**
−
0.
00
4
0.
01
9
−
0.
00
2
0.
02
8
0.
03
8
**
*
0.
08
0
**
*
0.
02
2
0.
05
9
**
0.
04
7
**
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.9
15
)
(0
.2
19
)
(0
.9
63
)
(0
.4
69
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
23
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
19
)
Fi
na
nc
e
*
hi
gh
es
t
ed
uc
.
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
6
0.
00
4
0.
00
1
−
0.
01
7
−
0.
04
1
**
*
0.
01
4
−
0.
02
8
*
−
0.
02
5
*
**
*,
**
an
d
*
si
gn
ify
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
of
th
e
ef
fe
ct
s
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
A
p
p
en
d
ix
B
.
Es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
APPLIED ECONOMICS 23
Ta
bl
e
B2
.L
og
it
re
su
lts
fo
r
up
w
ar
d
m
ob
ili
ty
of
m
ig
ra
nt
s’
ch
ild
re
n.
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Cz
ec
h
Re
pu
bl
ic
G
er
m
an
y
Es
to
ni
a
Fr
an
ce
Cr
oa
tia
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
La
tv
ia
U
K
Bi
rt
h
ye
ar
−
0.
02
1
**
0.
02
9
**
*
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
01
6
0.
00
6
0.
01
7
**
−
0.
00
2
−
0.
00
7
0.
00
2
−
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.5
64
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.5
23
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.6
72
)
(0
.3
81
)
(0
.6
78
)
(0
.4
76
)
(0
.5
01
)
Co
ho
rt
50
s
(d
)
−
0.
27
5
*
0.
30
0
**
*
−
0.
03
9
−
0.
23
2
0.
10
3
0.
34
8
**
*
−
0.
05
1
−
0.
13
6
−
0.
13
2
0.
00
9
−
0.
01
3
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
39
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.6
00
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.6
84
)
(0
.4
49
)
(0
.3
69
)
(0
.9
41
)
(0
.9
24
)
Co
ho
rt
60
s
(d
)
0.
01
5
0.
21
4
**
−
0.
02
9
0.
01
9
−
0.
12
3
0.
26
9
**
*
−
0.
02
7
0.
05
5
0.
00
7
0.
03
2
−
0.
04
7
(0
.9
26
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.6
72
)
(0
.9
01
)
(0
.3
56
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.7
15
)
(0
.6
55
)
(0
.9
34
)
(0
.7
16
)
(0
.5
90
)
M
al
e
(d
)
0.
13
0
−
0.
17
9
**
*
0.
12
4
**
*
−
0.
03
3
0.
01
1
−
0.
23
3
**
*
0.
04
0
0.
03
1
0.
09
2
**
−
0.
13
0
**
*
−
0.
10
5
**
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.6
61
)
(0
.8
55
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.5
80
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
26
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
−
0.
06
7
0.
06
6
−
0.
03
7
−
0.
01
8
0.
10
5
*
0.
04
0
0.
00
7
−
0.
02
4
0.
09
5
**
*
0.
00
9
0.
07
6
**
(0
.3
07
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.3
37
)
(0
.8
15
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.4
01
)
(0
.8
09
)
(0
.6
83
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.7
45
)
(0
.0
27
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
(/
10
0)
0.
06
0
−
0.
08
7
0.
06
8
0.
05
6
−
0.
13
5
−
0.
09
0
−
0.
02
7
0.
03
5
−
0.
20
1
**
*
−
0.
00
8
−
0.
11
8
**
(0
.5
62
)
(0
.1
78
)
(0
.3
00
)
(0
.6
88
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.5
42
)
(0
.7
29
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.8
45
)
(0
.0
17
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
0.
17
0
**
*
−
0.
01
5
0.
03
0
0.
04
9
0.
01
2
0.
05
7
0.
02
8
0.
08
5
−
0.
03
5
−
0.
03
4
−
0.
03
4
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.6
36
)
(0
.3
38
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.8
10
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.2
23
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.3
35
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
(/
10
0)
−
0.
17
1
**
0.
00
1
−
0.
03
7
−
0.
07
8
−
0.
05
4
−
0.
08
2
−
0.
01
6
−
0.
10
2
0.
09
6
**
0.
05
4
0.
03
5
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.9
80
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.1
97
)
(0
.4
32
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.6
11
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.4
06
)
Ag
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
pa
re
nt
s
−
0.
05
5
**
0.
00
5
−
0.
01
3
0.
00
9
0.
00
1
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
01
2
−
0.
00
9
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
5
0.
02
3
*
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.7
43
)
(0
.1
43
)
(0
.5
88
)
(0
.9
35
)
(0
.7
39
)
(0
.2
59
)
(0
.5
65
)
(0
.3
35
)
(0
.5
19
)
(0
.0
74
)
M
ot
he
r
ou
t
of
la
bo
ur
f.
(d
)
−
0.
07
0
−
0.
03
7
−
0.
02
8
−
0.
04
3
−
0.
07
9
−
0.
01
7
−
0.
09
6
**
*
−
0.
04
5
0.
02
5
0.
03
5
−
0.
07
8
(0
.4
64
)
(0
.6
16
)
(0
.4
99
)
(0
.6
90
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.8
76
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.5
40
)
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.6
74
)
(0
.1
46
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
−
0.
02
2
0.
12
4
0.
07
9
**
−
0.
20
5
0.
00
0
−
0.
07
4
0.
08
9
*
0.
17
6
**
0.
10
6
0.
22
1
**
*
−
0.
00
1
(0
.8
51
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.3
59
)
(0
.9
97
)
(0
.3
23
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.2
50
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.9
83
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
−
0.
15
0
0.
23
6
**
−
0.
01
9
0.
01
5
0.
18
5
0.
04
7
0.
04
9
0.
47
2
*
0.
25
2
**
*
0.
06
6
0.
10
0
(0
.3
19
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.7
73
)
(0
.9
55
)
(0
.2
26
)
(0
.5
63
)
(0
.4
72
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.2
80
)
(0
.4
03
)
H
ig
he
st
pa
re
nt
al
ed
uc
.
−
0.
26
6
−
1.
43
6
**
*
−
0.
62
4
**
*
−
0.
12
0
−
1.
12
1
**
*
0.
11
8
−
0.
31
4
*
−
0.
71
3
**
−
1.
82
4
**
*
−
0.
36
5
*
−
0.
33
1
(0
.4
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.8
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.7
00
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.1
03
)
#
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
hh
0.
03
1
−
0.
06
2
**
*
−
0.
00
1
−
0.
02
2
−
0.
01
4
−
0.
08
1
**
*
0.
01
1
−
0.
00
2
−
0.
03
7
**
−
0.
00
6
0.
01
9
(0
.4
34
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
75
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.6
37
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.2
44
)
(0
.9
28
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.6
81
)
(0
.4
89
)
#
of
ad
ul
ts
in
hh
−
0.
06
0
*
−
0.
05
5
**
−
0.
08
7
**
*
−
0.
08
2
**
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
03
5
−
0.
01
6
−
0.
04
3
**
0.
00
1
−
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.9
36
)
(0
.3
97
)
(0
.1
22
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.9
83
)
(0
.8
27
)
(0
.7
23
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
itu
at
io
n
0.
02
7
−
0.
15
3
−
0.
03
3
0.
02
0
−
0.
25
1
0.
34
0
**
0.
01
0
0.
08
2
−
0.
30
2
**
*
0.
10
8
0.
01
1
(0
.7
82
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.6
47
)
(0
.8
54
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.8
05
)
(0
.1
18
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.8
60
)
Fi
na
nc
e
*
hi
gh
es
t
ed
uc
.
−
0.
00
4
0.
15
4
*
0.
02
9
−
0.
04
6
0.
09
2
−
0.
16
2
**
−
0.
00
1
−
0.
05
7
0.
27
2
**
*
−
0.
07
2
0.
00
3
**
*,
**
an
d
*
si
gn
ify
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
of
th
e
ef
fe
ct
s
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
24 D. OBERDABERNIG AND A. SCHNEEBAUM
Ta
bl
e
B3
.D
et
ai
le
d
de
co
m
po
si
tio
n
re
su
lts
fo
r
up
w
ar
d
m
ob
ili
ty
.
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Cz
ec
h
Re
pu
bl
ic
G
er
m
an
y
Es
to
ni
a
Fr
an
ce
Cr
oa
tia
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
La
tv
ia
U
K
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
up
w
ar
d
m
ob
ili
ty
M
ig
ra
nt
s
47
.1
26
**
*
71
.4
29
**
*
61
.5
66
**
*
68
.9
32
**
*
53
.5
95
**
*
44
.7
70
**
*
82
.1
43
**
*
54
.7
95
**
*
58
.7
35
**
*
46
.6
99
**
*
90
.5
17
**
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
N
at
iv
es
44
.4
27
**
*
62
.0
75
**
*
37
.5
40
**
*
65
.7
62
**
*
39
.6
19
**
*
48
.4
86
**
*
77
.1
27
**
*
48
.3
35
**
*
40
.2
72
**
*
52
.4
35
**
*
71
.7
54
**
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
M
ob
ili
ty
ga
p
2.
69
9
9.
35
4
**
24
.0
26
**
*
3.
17
0
13
.9
75
**
*
−
3.
71
6
5.
01
6
**
6.
46
0
*
18
.4
63
**
*
−
5.
73
6
**
18
.7
63
**
*
(0
.6
16
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.5
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.2
73
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
00
)
Ex
pl
ai
ne
d
7.
68
4
**
*
3.
03
0
**
20
.3
93
**
*
8.
96
8
**
*
13
.1
47
**
*
0.
06
5
1.
82
7
**
*
1.
88
8
**
*
14
.1
02
**
*
−
1.
20
1
**
*
3.
05
0
**
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
73
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
U
ne
xp
la
in
ed
−
4.
98
5
6.
32
3
*
3.
63
3
*
−
5.
79
8
0.
82
8
−
3.
78
2
3.
19
0
*
4.
57
1
4.
36
1
*
−
4.
53
5
**
15
.7
13
**
*
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.7
76
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
00
)
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
of
co
va
ria
te
s
to
di
ffe
re
nc
es
in
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
(e
xp
la
in
ed
pa
rt
)
Bi
rt
h
ye
ar
−
1.
15
0
−
0.
31
9
−
1.
08
9
−
2.
57
9
**
*
0.
04
8
*
0.
14
4
1.
75
2
**
*
0.
17
4
1.
98
4
−
0.
47
2
0.
69
1
*
(0
.2
45
)
(0
.7
78
)
(0
.2
52
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
63
)
(0
.3
26
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
69
)
Co
ho
rt
ef
fe
ct
s
1.
12
2
1.
58
5
*
1.
70
7
*
0.
73
1
−
0.
05
0
0.
07
3
0.
52
4
0.
13
6
2.
70
8
1.
30
7
**
*
0.
39
3
(0
.2
44
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.4
84
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.2
17
)
(0
.8
13
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.3
21
)
G
en
de
r
−
0.
44
6
**
*
−
0.
06
5
**
−
0.
18
0
**
*
−
0.
05
2
**
*
−
0.
14
2
**
*
−
0.
56
0
**
*
0.
08
6
**
−
0.
10
9
**
*
0.
27
7
**
*
−
1.
54
3
**
*
−
0.
00
8
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
12
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
1.
79
3
**
−
0.
04
9
−
2.
22
3
**
0.
91
0
2.
90
4
**
0.
00
2
1.
32
2
*
−
0.
16
3
−
1.
57
9
**
1.
18
9
3.
56
7
**
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.4
91
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.5
63
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.9
13
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.9
22
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.1
48
)
(0
.0
12
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
−
2.
20
7
**
−
0.
47
8
*
1.
92
3
**
−
1.
27
9
−
3.
26
9
**
0.
04
6
−
1.
49
9
**
−
0.
47
2
0.
79
5
**
−
1.
05
6
−
3.
19
3
**
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.8
00
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.7
61
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.0
19
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
bi
rt
h
0.
41
1
4.
16
6
*
−
0.
94
5
*
0.
08
4
2.
59
4
−
0.
75
2
1.
05
3
2.
61
7
**
*
−
0.
73
4
0.
05
4
−
1.
26
0
(0
.3
53
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.8
41
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.6
10
)
(0
.5
84
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.6
68
)
(0
.3
97
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ag
e
at
b.
,s
q
−
0.
14
0
−
2.
97
5
1.
04
4
*
0.
16
2
−
0.
52
5
0.
64
4
−
0.
04
5
−
1.
47
7
*
0.
37
6
−
0.
00
1
1.
62
3
(0
.7
78
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.7
02
)
(0
.7
11
)
(0
.6
79
)
(0
.9
81
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.3
62
)
(0
.9
41
)
(0
.2
33
)
Ag
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
pa
re
nt
s
0.
04
5
−
1.
91
3
**
0.
01
4
0.
01
7
−
0.
48
9
**
*
0.
42
1
−
0.
61
0
0.
12
7
**
−
0.
05
7
0.
42
3
**
−
0.
39
7
(0
.2
45
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.8
95
)
(0
.6
24
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.4
54
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.1
50
)
M
ot
he
r’s
la
bo
ur
m
.s
ta
t.
−
0.
02
3
−
0.
57
8
**
−
0.
22
8
−
0.
63
8
**
*
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
03
2
−
0.
10
9
0.
06
8
−
0.
26
7
−
0.
09
2
−
0.
08
5
(0
.8
60
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.3
20
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
38
)
(0
.6
82
)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.6
92
)
(0
.3
25
)
(0
.3
31
)
(0
.4
26
)
M
ot
he
r’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
−
2.
24
3
**
*
−
2.
61
5
**
−
2.
68
8
**
*
−
1.
96
9
**
*
−
1.
76
5
**
*
0.
73
0
**
*
−
1.
46
7
**
*
−
1.
25
2
**
*
−
2.
26
8
**
*
−
0.
40
3
**
*
−
0.
16
6
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
33
)
Fa
th
er
’s
ed
uc
at
io
n
−
1.
43
8
*
−
1.
98
9
**
−
1.
50
8
−
2.
04
6
**
*
−
0.
25
3
0.
37
3
**
*
−
0.
62
1
*
−
0.
93
0
**
*
−
3.
38
9
**
0.
62
7
**
*
0.
08
6
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.1
78
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
35
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
49
)
H
ig
he
st
pa
re
nt
al
ed
uc
.
10
.9
22
**
*
10
.6
54
**
*
24
.2
78
**
*
19
.0
44
**
*
14
.5
69
**
*
−
1.
81
8
**
*
3.
34
9
**
*
3.
28
7
**
*
18
.4
29
**
*
−
1.
06
6
**
*
3.
84
8
**
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
#
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
hh
0.
18
1
−
0.
89
6
**
*
0.
70
1
**
−
3.
64
1
**
*
0.
01
8
**
0.
76
6
**
−
1.
11
6
**
*
−
0.
50
0
**
*
−
0.
11
2
0.
12
9
**
*
−
1.
34
0
**
*
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.3
25
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
#
of
ad
ul
ts
in
hh
0.
13
2
*
−
0.
21
5
*
0.
39
3
**
*
−
0.
34
9
**
−
0.
07
6
0.
00
6
−
1.
29
0
**
*
0.
10
1
0.
39
9
**
0.
08
4
*
−
2.
23
3
**
*
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.1
89
)
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.5
81
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
00
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
itu
at
io
n
0.
35
0
*
−
2.
11
7
*
0.
00
1
−
0.
59
1
−
0.
00
9
0.
04
1
−
0.
57
6
**
−
1.
17
2
**
*
−
0.
20
0
0.
13
8
**
−
0.
25
5
**
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.9
95
)
(0
.2
25
)
(0
.9
69
)
(0
.4
45
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
26
)
Fi
na
nc
e
*
hi
gh
es
t
ed
uc
.
0.
37
7
0.
83
3
−
0.
80
8
1.
16
6
−
0.
39
4
0.
00
5
1.
06
9
1.
45
3
**
*
−
2.
26
6
−
0.
54
2
*
1.
78
1
*
(0
.5
67
)
(0
.7
72
)
(0
.8
05
)
(0
.5
33
)
(0
.8
74
)
(0
.9
77
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
56
)
N
39
90
30
51
37
36
55
18
55
14
26
17
68
86
42
43
28
35
34
68
35
82
**
*,
**
an
d
*
si
gn
ify
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
of
th
e
ef
fe
ct
s
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 25
Table B4. Detailed decomposition results for downward mobility.
Austria Switzerland Germany Estonia France Croatia Luxembourg Latvia
Probability of downward mobility
Migrants 15.094 *** 6.309 *** 7.035 *** 20.728 *** 2.696 *** 6.383 *** 6.704 *** 14.800 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natives 11.425 *** 8.288 *** 14.519 *** 16.169 *** 4.589 *** 6.470 *** 13.147 *** 13.410 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mobility gap 3.669 −1.979 −7.484 *** 4.559 ** −1.893 * −0.087 −6.443 *** 1.390
(0.242) (0.215) (0.003) (0.028) (0.072) (0.958) (0.000) (0.394)
Explained 0.280 −0.740 *** −3.505 *** 0.611 * −2.235 *** −0.731 ** −5.458 *** −0.322
(0.370) (0.001) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.155)
Unexplained 3.389 −1.239 −3.979 *** 3.948 ** 0.342 0.644 −0.984 1.712
(0.151) (0.275) (0.001) (0.025) (0.486) (0.754) (0.380) (0.205)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth year 0.165 −0.052 −0.497 *** −0.814 *** 0.019 −0.211 −0.515 −0.356 **
(0.297) (0.811) (0.003) (0.000) (0.309) (0.190) (0.550) (0.042)
Cohort effects 0.011 −0.418 0.322 ** 0.055 −0.066 ** 0.121 −1.195 −0.155
(0.948) (0.101) (0.026) (0.719) (0.043) (0.283) (0.155) (0.393)
Gender 0.122 ** −0.087 *** −0.040 *** −0.198 *** −0.038 *** −0.012 −0.128 *** 0.499 ***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.469) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother’s age at birth 0.331 0.264 −0.816 −0.253 −0.202 −1.461 ** 0.154 −0.261
(0.704) (0.470) (0.199) (0.533) (0.268) (0.019) (0.180) (0.520)
Mother’s age at b., sq −0.157 −0.291 1.091 * 0.277 0.173 1.299 ** 0.102 0.249
(0.852) (0.404) (0.089) (0.432) (0.362) (0.014) (0.526) (0.515)
Father’s age at birth −2.324 * −0.101 −0.786 1.093 *** −0.165 −0.106 −0.453 * 0.182
(0.054) (0.598) (0.179) (0.004) (0.713) (0.770) (0.086) (0.535)
Father’s age at b., sq 1.801 0.157 0.204 −1.249 *** 0.180 −0.012 0.402 −0.190
(0.125) (0.430) (0.705) (0.009) (0.676) (0.962) (0.242) (0.393)
Age difference parents 0.244 * 0.051 * 0.050 * 0.002 −0.042 0.042 0.166 −0.046
(0.097) (0.090) (0.060) (0.989) (0.549) (0.318) (0.178) (0.307)
Mother’s labour m. stat. 0.021 0.076 −0.003 −0.008 −0.027 0.049 −0.011 0.029
(0.774) (0.275) (0.801) (0.422) (0.414) (0.535) (0.922) (0.571)
Mother’s education 0.184 *** 0.116 * 1.120 *** −0.996 *** 0.480 *** 0.587 *** 0.404 *** 0.783 ***
(0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father’s education 0.136 * 0.024 0.978 *** −1.707 *** 0.456 *** 0.342 *** 2.054 *** −0.542 ***
(0.080) (0.303) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Highest parental educ. 0.019 −0.278 ** −4.151 *** 4.612 *** −3.357 *** −2.506 *** −10.956 *** −0.246 ***
(0.917) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# of children in hh −0.086 −0.202 * −0.006 −0.242 −0.003 0.791 *** 0.063 −0.218 ***
(0.157) (0.078) (0.886) (0.241) (0.955) (0.000) (0.314) (0.000)
# of adults in hh 0.021 −0.059 0.012 0.046 0.025 0.053 −0.103 0.000
(0.187) (0.403) (0.638) (0.160) (0.692) (0.304) (0.162) (0.999)
Financial situation −1.018 *** 0.140 1.262 *** −0.014 −0.119 0.056 −0.672 *** −0.075
(0.007) (0.394) (0.001) (0.549) (0.488) (0.817) (0.000) (0.231)
Finance * highest educ. 0.810 * −0.078 −2.245 *** 0.000 0.454 0.234 5.230 *** 0.031
(0.057) (0.720) (0.005) (1.000) (0.398) (0.553) (0.000) (0.290)
N 4745 4395 8154 3505 8013 4609 3142 4251
***, ** and * signify significance of the effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B5. Detailed decomposition results for upward mobility conditioned on parental education.
Belgium Switzerland Czech Republic Estonia France Croatia Luxembourg Latvia
Probability of upward mobility conditioned on parental education
Migrants 75.248 *** 92.913 *** 76.543 *** 82.278 *** 82.647 *** 70.073 *** 71.250 *** 83.529 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natives 71.196 *** 83.810 *** 89.965 *** 83.612 *** 80.302 *** 68.255 *** 57.996 *** 79.787 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mobility gap 4.052 9.104 *** −13.422 *** −1.334 2.345 1.818 13.254 *** 3.742
(0.381) (0.008) (0.000) (0.760) (0.290) (0.657) (0.000) (0.249)
Explained −0.662 4.919 *** −6.129 *** 0.379 1.144 ** 1.072 7.038 *** 1.650 ***
(0.532) (0.004) (0.000) (0.548) (0.012) (0.119) (0.000) (0.004)
Unexplained 4.714 4.185 −7.293 * −1.713 1.200 0.746 6.216 * 2.093
(0.200) (0.121) (0.057) (0.580) (0.551) (0.833) (0.073) (0.499)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth year 1.162 −0.620 −1.123 −0.016 3.306 *** −0.167 7.367 * 0.983 **
(0.474) (0.873) (0.123) (0.873) (0.000) (0.896) (0.096) (0.011)
Cohort effects 2.094 * 2.885 −0.401 −0.031 −0.354 1.495 −1.079 1.176 **
(0.099) (0.445) (0.650) (0.927) (0.533) (0.216) (0.790) (0.014)
Gender −0.024 0.434 *** −0.349 *** 0.119 ** 0.229 *** −0.126 *** 0.885 *** −0.568 ***
(0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mother’s age at birth −0.152 5.154 −0.340 0.009 1.134 −0.180 −1.916 2.441
(0.816) (0.215) (0.823) (0.966) (0.106) (0.914) (0.294) (0.137)
Mother’s age at b., sq 0.106 −5.284 −0.231 0.093 −1.393 ** −0.512 0.949 −1.737
(0.786) (0.188) (0.882) (0.844) (0.047) (0.750) (0.520) (0.258)
Father’s age at birth 4.791 * −6.355 −0.160 0.319 0.577 2.271 ** −1.349 −0.049
(0.059) (0.152) (0.712) (0.871) (0.753) (0.011) (0.496) (0.730)
Father’s age at b., sq −4.285 * 6.155 0.386 −1.153 0.399 −1.314 * 1.306 0.183
(0.085) (0.162) (0.337) (0.583) (0.824) (0.074) (0.476) (0.434)
Age difference parents −1.178 0.061 0.004 0.665 −0.643 * 0.286 ** 0.035 −0.290
(0.168) (0.856) (0.876) (0.105) (0.057) (0.019) (0.807) (0.478)
Mother’s labour m. stat. −0.626 *** 0.187 −0.320 *** −0.333 −0.121 0.563 ** −0.161 −0.093
(0.004) (0.638) (0.002) (0.134) (0.291) (0.025) (0.659) (0.614)
# of children in hh −0.585 * 1.667 ** −3.356 *** 0.362 −0.793 *** −0.501 ** 0.010 −0.239 **
(0.054) (0.039) (0.000) (0.332) (0.000) (0.020) (0.760) (0.012)
# of adults in hh −0.067 0.669 * −0.133 −0.112 ** −1.011 *** 0.122 0.222 0.157
(0.363) (0.089) (0.108) (0.028) (0.000) (0.625) (0.545) (0.137)
Financial situation −1.897 *** −0.035 −0.106 0.459 * −0.188 *** −0.864 *** 0.766 *** −0.325 *
(0.000) (0.918) (0.215) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.086)
***, ** and * signify significance of the effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 27
Table B6. Detailed decomposition results for upward mobility of two education levels conditioned on parental education.
Belgium Switzerland Germany Estonia France Luxembourg Latvia UK
Probability of upward mobility
Migrants 22.772 *** 17.323 *** 31.481 *** 20.253 *** 28.824 *** 15.417 *** 14.118 *** 46.512 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natives 25.660 *** 13.333 *** 26.972 *** 19.856 *** 25.196 *** 11.673 *** 15.805 *** 29.926 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mobility gap −2.887 3.990 4.509 0.397 3.628 3.744 −1.688 16.586 ***
(0.517) (0.238) (0.479) (0.933) (0.136) (0.111) (0.569) (0.001)
Explained −2.379 ** 4.528 ** 4.860 ** 1.227 ** −1.225 *** 5.870 *** −0.441 0.028
(0.020) (0.042) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000) (0.223) (0.971)
Unexplained −0.508 −0.539 −0.351 −0.830 4.853 ** −2.126 −1.246 16.557 ***
(0.889) (0.894) (0.950) (0.729) (0.039) (0.401) (0.627) (0.001)
Contribution of covariates to differences in characteristics (explained part)
Birth year −1.920 3.488 −2.306 −0.035 0.754 2.850 −0.028 0.593
(0.154) (0.431) (0.552) (0.612) (0.170) (0.337) (0.867) (0.375)
Cohort effects 1.933 * −3.015 3.794 0.214 1.080 ** 2.779 0.078 0.119
(0.055) (0.468) (0.195) (0.270) (0.022) (0.316) (0.702) (0.863)
Gender −0.085 0.332 *** 0.622 *** −0.017 −0.153 ** 0.241 −0.429 *** −0.112
(0.106) (0.004) (0.000) (0.682) (0.023) (0.105) (0.000) (0.124)
Mother’s age at birth −0.358 8.673 3.880 0.028 1.683 ** −3.641 ** 0.868 3.065 *
(0.629) (0.109) (0.286) (0.800) (0.015) (0.049) (0.295) (0.097)
Mother’s age at b., sq 0.120 −7.904 −3.778 −0.140 −1.458 ** 3.067 * −0.582 −2.820 *
(0.793) (0.105) (0.320) (0.598) (0.035) (0.057) (0.389) (0.096)
Father’s age at birth 2.536 −13.826 *** 3.313 ** −1.768 −1.208 −1.474 −1.473 ** 1.522
(0.291) (0.002) (0.018) (0.304) (0.523) (0.434) (0.040) (0.449)
Father’s age at b., sq −2.559 14.009 *** −1.885 ** 2.046 1.212 0.935 1.684 ** −0.354
(0.276) (0.001) (0.048) (0.257) (0.510) (0.601) (0.047) (0.835)
Age difference parents −0.512 −0.276 1.175 0.057 −0.388 0.193 −0.178 −0.406
(0.559) (0.275) (0.307) (0.882) (0.312) (0.321) (0.613) (0.288)
Mother’s labour m. stat. −0.163 −0.066 0.216 0.059 0.021 0.085 −0.068 0.080
(0.513) (0.913) (0.637) (0.734) (0.838) (0.810) (0.522) (0.711)
# of children in hh −0.743 ** 2.405 *** 0.158 0.792 *** −1.334 *** 0.044 −0.172 *** −0.672
(0.029) (0.007) (0.352) (0.000) (0.000) (0.184) (0.003) (0.134)
# of adults in hh −0.273 *** 0.038 0.254 −0.206 ** −1.280 *** 0.543 ** 0.058 ** −1.009 ***
(0.006) (0.916) (0.390) (0.036) (0.000) (0.026) (0.017) (0.000)
Financial situation −0.354 0.671 −0.582 0.197 −0.158 *** 0.240 −0.202 * 0.023 *
(0.424) (0.102) (0.110) (0.237) (0.000) (0.170) (0.082) (0.084)
***, ** and * signify significance of the effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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